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CHAPTER T : THE HISTORY OF ITIGSRXA
- "Events m  Nigeria, Hirschmarin, have amusod use • - 
. somewhat. you nviy remember .shat-I Had the “verve to
suggest that you couldn't unda^&r&ay. aiger.^'s foreign .
. ■ policy and ganoral international course if  you had no .
idea o£ its internal kxibul structure, Wall? Do you 
still disagree. X aiu sorry it has taken a war to 
prove my point." ■ {1}
• Today Nigeria (inclusive of the secessionist Hepublic.
of Bxafra) covers an area of 356/669 square miles. This makes 
it  half as large as Western Europe and four times as large as 
the United Kingdom. l-ha much disputed 1963 census figures put 
•the population at 55j600,000, the highest in Africa, the fourth 
highest in  the commonwealth and the thirteenth in the world,
Nigeria is located on the north coast of the Gulf of 
:Guinea-anct its: coastline, .which includes the Sights of Benia-.- - 
and Baifra, stretches for 500 miles from Sadagry in the west to 
<?alabar in' the east. It  shares its western boundary wit}- Daho­
mey; -its northern boundary with N*ger and its eastern boundary - 
with Cameroon- in the extreme north-east corner a shared border 
with Chad runs through x*s&e Chad. All Nigeria's neighbours, 
therefor®, are former French colonies. . •
The drainage system provided by the great Niger. River 
and its tributary, the Benue, is the most striking physical 
feature*. Flowing from north-west and north-east tltrough the • 
middle of the territory to the sea, these two rivers divide Ni­
geria into throe land blocs and provide relatively easy access 
to the heart of the country. This feature has been of great im­
portance} along their valleys came most ancestors of Nigeria's 
present inhabitants* - .
From the coast northwards Nigeria falls into four geo­
graphical regions.. The first ia a dense belt of mangrove fo­
rests and swamps stretching along the length of the coast, where 
the temperature and humidity are generally high. The mangroves 
once extended much further north/ bat Luman settlement has en~ 
croaehed, especially in the west, where they terminate about 50 
miles from Lagos, aehind them lies the STigerian rainforest 
which covers most of the south, running through the old Western,
1. tetter Crom a friend, Arthur A, Mawby, at cartridge umver- 
sity, dd. 8.1.68*
2Mid.-Wi3st.ern and Eastern Regions, and divided almost centrally 
by the tfigcr. .Further north =he rainforest yields to savannah 
country extending to the northern Iron tier and the fringes of 
the Sahara. The northern dry savannah, with increased tempera­
ture ranges and lower humidify iavals, stretches from Sokofco to. 
Lake Chad and in parts reaches as far south as Oyo in the old 
■Western Region. Its southern edge is bounded by the Jos plateau, 
with which it merger, in Bornu. Tha altitude of much of the 
north is  ever ?.,000 feet above sea level, with the centra of 
this plateau rising to 2,000 feet and* in the Jds area, to an 
average of 4,000 feet. Haro was the location of Sigoria's old­
est known civilisation, the soft culture.
A . Earlv History and .MicrcMri^ns. -
What is known of 1'i.\r?ria‘s history goes bad? well over
2,000 years. Little, howavarr in clear since-the main sources - 
are oral traditions, legends and myths, and only in the. north., 
vfaere. the Kanuri and Kausa peoples bad made contact with an Arab 
culture, were any extensive written records kept before the • 
.nineteenth century. '
- (The oldest known tools made by man in Nigeria, pebble
;tools fro?* the earlier African Stone age, ware found near Bussa 
along the Niger in north-west Nigeria- A later period of this - 
Age, the ftehtmlean period, is well represented by hand axes 
found on the Jos plateau# for one of Which a radio carbon, date 
of more than 39,000 years BC fas been obtained, sangoan man 
who followed, and who t^robably ‘knew how to make fire, can be 
traced through tools found in the valley of the Sokofco River 
and in the Abuja-Keftfei region as well as round Bussa. Ground 
stone axes of the ifeolithic period are to be found in many parts 
of. the country, indicating a wide distribution of population in 
the late Stone Ages.
A major change in the population pattern seems to have 
taken place from about 2,000 BC ou.,.-\Ja. Owing to climatic chan­
ge and misuse of the lands of the Sahara which produced desert 
conditions, many pastoral peoples wer-s forced to move south. Of 
.both Gerber and negro stock, they knew how to cultivate wheat and 
-barley and in the south encountered Hagro populations, who, while 
mot settled farmers, practised vegeculture. -?he crops of the Sa­
hara ware not easily cultivated in the tropics; for this reason.
3and because the old food gathering techniques of the original in­
habitants no longer sufficed, the new mixed population developed 
large-scale farming of a wide r.ange of new crops. Thus emerged 
the late Stone Age culture of Nok whoso name was subsequently 
given to a widespread culture that flourished on the Jos plateau 
between 900 BC and 400 AD.
There is little information on Nigerian history during 
the first thousand years.AD. Almost certainly population pres- . 
sures from the north forced people from the Nigerian plateau 
south-eastwards through the Cameroons into Equatorial Africa 
where, with, their iron weapons, they displaced the local pygsnies, 
This would account for the clone linguistic relationship of the 
people of the'plateau with those of Equatorial Africa- At about 
the same time, from other parts of Africa, in small and larger 
.groups, hot* Ssgxo and Hamitic peoples were migrating towards 
Nigeria. The degress, whose original home remains doubtful, were 
the first to arrive, The most plausible theory, based on legends 
of origin and archeological evidence, places their source in 
north-easfc Africa, whence they migrated westwards "by. way of the . 
open land south of the Sahara and north of the Congo basin and - , 
the tropical forest, crossing the Bornu plains into Nigeria and 
fanning out in a ll  Sirccfcions; most of them, moving ‘along the 
valley of the Benue north-westwards fa the Siger and north-east, 
up the uongola to the headwaters < *e chad1.
• • "  ■ From the numerous legrer ^ origin it is. reasonable . 
to infer that the Voruba and Haw» peoples arrived at about the 
same time from the same areas in north-eastern Africa and that ■ 
they had for centuries had historical and cultural connections. 
Population movements and influences of later migrants from the 
Middle East and North Africa had by 1400 AD resulted in great, 
differences between * > • peoples of the northern savannah and 
the southern forest a es. -
In the course of time neither the Negroes nor the Sa­
mites have remained as pure race groups. ?.n the north there are 
small enclaves of Arab peoples who have a '•icwmon origin with the 
Karaites in Kano, Sokoto, 2aria and Bornu, <.:twn as Shuwa Arabs. 
The cattle Fulani are probably the purest ranitic atoalc, while
1. Arifcpo, Okoij The Development of Mot. .' - Nigeria, Middlesex, 
1957, p. 16. .
s p s s s * "- "
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the Ijo of the Niger Delta are the most Negroid.
B. £,atar History and, the Tribes. -
■ when Britain carved out Nigeria for itssjf it created 
'perhaps the most artificial of the many administrative units 
created in the courses of the European occupation of A frica '. ^
I. The North, the Bausa, the gulani and Islam? the British.
. An importot formative influence on the culture, the
wary of life and the social and political organisation in the 
Forth was its geography. The open savannah country permitted 
fat larger groupings than did the southern forested areas. The 
relative lack o£ wild fruits and roots and the denser popula­
tions necessitated the practice of both agriculture and irriga­
tion, and these in turn led to the consolidation of groups to 
protect their farmlands- Conditions were .moreover favourable 
to freer and greater movement: horses were able to survive owing 
to the absence of the tsetse fly , and political control could be 
enforced over great distances. The necessity for organised ca­
valry led to qussi-feudal forms of economic, social and politi­
cal organisation* • . . ■ -
. . (Thus there developed centralized states ruled by po­
werful Btonarohs, based art the agricultural and physical advan­
tages of the northern savannah. 'The military strength of these 
status far exceeded that of the smaller southern units? yet, .
. enclosed as they, war© in dense forest impenetrable to horsemen, 
they could not be subjected by the north­
. She great Rausa peoples occupied most of the northern 
half of north Nigeria, principally the provinces of sokoto, K&t- 
sina, Kano and Zaria, and ponetrated southward to an irregular 
extent. The Hausa have been unified through their common cul­
ture, religion and history rather than because of ethnic distinc­
tion. The basic social unit is the extended family,, determined 
by consanguinity and not affinity. Islam inculcated the values 
of a class system, in which social superiors are regarded with 
deference, their authority being accepted as the will of God.
They are. a Negro people, yet their language is distantly related 
to those of the Semitic and Haraifcie races- political unity, .how­
ever, was not attained until their conquest by the Fulani, The .
1. Lord Baily, in Post, K .W .J ., is There a Case for Biafra?, 
international affairs, January, 1968, p. 27.
seven original Hausa states or Bakwai, ware said to"have been 
founded about 2,000 years ago by Bawo and his six sons ^  which 
dad provide a common traditional unity; and f- . «s states have 
survived, to form the basis of the northern pr<- . .
In medieval times there flourished i . Western and 
Central Sudan {including the north of Nigeria! 4 succession of 
powerful states, the last of which same to an end only with co- , 
lonial occupation, The Hausa vailed city-state of Kano and the 
Kamxci Empire of Kanem-Bomu (which in the twelfth century was 
accredited with an army of 120,000 men a$d 100,000 hors®/ ex­
eluding mercenaries) as well as the states -of Ghana, Mali and 
Songhai might well be described as ‘market empires, since the 
basis of their prosperity lay not so much in what they produced 
themselves . . .  bat as middlemen in the exchange of products be­
tween North Africa and areas to the south of them'. ^  Through 
such. trans-Sabaran trad« these Sudanese states made contact with 
the world of Islam. . Ihe religion was first accepted by only- a 
small minority, mainly among t‘ne ruling classes (Mai-Ure, who • 
ruled, from.10S5 to 1097  ^ was the first ruler to be converted), 
eventually becoming the iropsrial culture and, finally being es- ■ 
tablished by 1500 throughout the Northern states. • • - .
• Zaxia, the most southerly of the Hausa states, was in 
a. position to gain importance as the chief supplier of slaves 
to: Katsina and Kano, Kano reached its zenith in about 1500 and 
by 1700 it  was Katsma which had von the long struggle for as- . 
cendemcy and control of trade along the caravan routes and for 
about &  hundred years it was to remain the leading commercial 
•and cultural centre in Kortfcerh Nigeria. .. •
. Islam conferred on-the.people of the Western Sudan a
1. A.legend telle that Bayajidda, son of Abdulahi, King of Bag­
dad, quarrelled with his father and travelled first to 
Bornu and then to Baur-* whore his son Bawo was born- Bawo
• ’killed the sacred se. -it that guarded the well at Daura 
. and prevented people **m drawing water there. The queen
•• of Daura was so pleased at the death of the shske that she
• gav.e her daughter in marriage to Bawo, and out of that
. union were born the seven children who founded the seven 
Hausa states... in addition to the seven legitimate sons 
there .were seven illegitimate ones, who fumded the king- . 
dams of Kebbi, gamxara, Nupa, Gwari, Yo'nVUi, Kwararafa 
. (CTukun) Arikpo, Okoi, op. c it ., p. IS.
2. Crowder, Michael, The Story of Nigeria, Second Edition, Lon­
don, 1966, pp. 35 and 36.
literate culture. The Arabic language linked then culturally 
with North Africa. Literacy facilitated trade and brought with 
it the law of the Koran and Moslem administrative systems, Vn- 
fcil the nineteenth century/ however, it did not bring about any 
revolutionary ahange and did not fundamentally alter the tradi­
tional bases upon which African political and social life depend­
ed,. In the nineteenth century this situation was to he complete­
ly transformed by the impact of agressive Islamic revolutionary 
movements, highly critical of traditional political and social 
organisation and determined to overthrow the old societies and 
supersede them with new systems more strictly obedient to Islam* 
These movements received their impetus from the Fulam 
peoples, notably the Toxodbe, who had came under the influence 
of Islam as early as the eleventh century ana who by the four­
teenth century hatf become proselyfcisers of their religion through­
out th* Western Sudan. ?hey had 1 originated m  the Senegal area
- probably as a result of intermarriage between 'white' Berber 
and Kegro groups - and emerged as a 'reu'-skmned, straight­
nosed race speaking a distinct language which is  difficult to 
classify*. ^  Essentially a cattle people, they were allowed 
to spread throughout the savannah area., permitted by peoples 
like the Hausa to gras© their cattle on the land in return for . 
the value c f  the manure, . By the end of the sixteenth century . . 
they had established themselves throughout Hausaland, and with . 
the collapse of the Songhai Empire at about this time, became • 
the main standard bearers of Islam. . .
. ■ -Three types of Fulani may be distinguished - the pas­
toral nomadic; the settled? and the dynastic. ^  The first are 
peaceful herders, non-ifegroid and often indifferent Moslems or . 
even pagans, ^he second group, largely agricultural, and inter­
mixed with Hausa and other fcfegro groups are the fanatic Moslems.
In fact it was the Fulani who settled in the towns and became 
learned and literate in Islamic culture who led the Islamic re­
ligious revolution. The dynastic group consists of families 
of Emirs ~nd officials of the Emirates. Their greatest, distinc­
tion was their ability to build states through wars o£ conquest 
and to administer and control them.
1. Flint, o’ohn E ., Nigeria and Ghana, New Jersey, 1966, p. 9.
2. Blitz, L. Franklin, The politics and administration of wi-
gerian Government, London and Lagos, 1965, p.  23. .
f ^  e* / JPffC
The causes, motives and aims underlying the great Ji~ 
had of 1804 are not simple to explain. To Usman (Othman) San 
Fodio, who headed this holy war, the purpose was similar to that 
of other movements taking place in Cytenaica, Saudi Arabia and 
the Western Sudan, and to those of the Ma.h<2i in former Egyptian 
Sudan: . ■■.
- " . . .  ‘a return to the pure and primitive faith
.. of Islam, purged of heresies and accretions'. This 
implied the attempt to restore tho original modal of 
. - .the Islamic State, as it was believed to have existed '
• - in the time of the Prophet and the first four Cali­
. phas.* a State in which social justice, administered 
. in the light of the Shari'a by God-fearing rulers,
■ toolc the place of the arbitrary decisions of irrespon-
- sible - and effectively non-Moslem - despots." {1)
But for many of the great number who joined the war there were 
other reasons? the insecurity of the minority Fu.Lani group, 
gre&t£y outnumbered by the Hausa.- the feeling of resentment of. 
the • cattle’ 5*ulani against the Kabe Hausa for heavy taxation 
and raids on their animals? and simple tribal loyalty which per­
suaded many Puiani who were not even Moslems to join the cause. 
Harsh taxation and other forms of oppression resulted in Hausa. 
commoners joining Ban Podio and there were influential urban 
Fulani who had their own economic and political reasons for sup­
porting the war, . . . . .
Usman dan Fodio, a Torodbe fiorn in 1754, a famous Mos­
lem scholar and reformist from Gobir, found hitnself at the cen­
tre of this, unrest. In 1804 he initiated a war that was soon to 
sweep away most of tfhe Hausa icings, and during the next thirty 
years to bring t^e whole of Hausaland and, with a few exceptions, 
all of Northern .sigaeia under the suzerainty of the Fulani. *Dhe 
.Shehu. entrusted his army to his son, Bello, and to his brother, 
Abdullahi, who had feaTcsn control of the great Hausa cities by 
1807 and most of Hausaland by 1808. Theit first serious set­
backs came in the east where Bormi under Kanembu repelled them, 
and in the south where tho expansion of the empire ran into fur- 
.ther difficulty on encountering the Nupo and yoruba peoples and 
the pagans of the inaccessible hill areas of the Middle Belt? 
parts of Kebhi were also not conquered. Dan Podio divided his 
new empire into an Eastern and a Western fcector.. The former
1. Hodgkin, Thomas, in Crowder, Michael, op. ext. , p. 96.
with headquarters at Sokoto came under the administration of 
his son Bello and the latter with headquarters at Gwandu was 
administered by Abdullah!. The Shehu himself chose to make So- 
■koto his home and this city was in fact the supreme centre. In 
1817 he died, and Bello succeeded Mm as the first Sultan of 
Sokoto. By 1830 the Fulani were masters of nearly all the 
north of Nigeria, effectively bringing uniform government to 
this huge area and superimposing on the traditional feudal ad­
ministration of the flausas a system of theocratic .tax-' Jllecting 
Svtltanates. In the peaceful conditions so created a great re- 
vt-ml in Moslem learning took place, and commerce and trade, 
centred again in Kano, tlirove on a much larger scale than under 
the Kansas. . 1
For o period the new rulers administered their Emi-
■ rates- in accordance with the principles of Koranic law but la- .. 
ter their high standards and reforming zeal steadily degenorated 
into corruption and tyranny. Large-scale slave-raiding was re-- - 
sumed, not only on their pagan neighbours hut even on their oym 
subjects. Sokoto and Owandu, nonetheless remained m  control 
and the S'ulani maintained their position as the ruling class; and 
by admitting Haissas, by intermarrying with them, and.by influenc­
ing them in the directions a purer form of Islam, they prevent­
ed any serious racial conflict. The two peoples eventually came . 
to represent one cultural pattern, very definitely Moslem in in*­
. spiration. ■ •
' During most o£ the nineteenth century events which
seemed of .little, import fas the north, but which were of vital 
significance to its future, were taking place in the southern 
coastal a r e a s B r i t a i n ,  steadily but haphazardly, tttok con­
trol of the south of Nigeria. As explorers opened up the hin­
terland, as traders saw the benefits of trading directly with • 
the.north, and as German and French pressures increased in the 
scramble for west African territory, the British Government was 
forced to turn its attention to the 'dark* north, although Den­
ham had visited Bornu in 1823 and Clapperton sokoto and Kano in 
1824 there wets virtually no European contaot with the north be­
fore the last quarter of the nineteenth century. 3.1 was the man 
who came to be known as the founder of modern Nigeria, George
1. British activity in Nigeria is discussed in the next section 
The actions of the British in the north can .bette* be un­
derstood in the light of their overall aims in Nigeria.-
Dashwood Goldie Taubman, who in effect succeeded in bringing the 
north into the British sphere of influence. He was determines 
to prevent the French and Germans from securing the lands of the 
Niger Basin. Given the right to make treaties and acting as if 
he had a charter, he had by 1884 concluded thirty-seven treaties 
with local chiefs. When in that year ths Germans despatched 
Herr Flegel to sign treaties with the Sultan of Sokoto and the 
Emir of Gwandu it was Goldie, through Joseph Thompson/ who pre­
vented him so doing. This was the more important since the Ber­
lin Conference of 1885 based delimitation on effective occupa­
tion, and as a result o f Goldie's work Britain had little diffi­
culty in laying claim to tho whole area around the Niger.
It  was nevertheless little more than a cartographical 
claim. In 1886 the Royal Niger Company was given a charter, hut 
it  had little authority beyond the gun range of .its river ves­
sels, only in 1897 was any effective administration introduced 
into the north* troops of the Royal Niger Company having defeat­
ed. ths forces* of the Brairs of Nupe and llorin, and obtained . 
treaties from them. Sot until 1900 when the northern part of 
Nigeria became the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria and the Bri­
tish flag was hoisted at Lokoja were real attempts made .to estab­
lish British control. Sir Frederick (later Lord) Lugar&( the 
first High Commissioner, had only £135,000 to set up administra­
tion over fifteen million people. In order to handle this seem­
ingly impossible task he formulated his policy of indirect rule, . 
which attempted merely tci create favourable conditions for trade 
and to ensure those essentials considered basic to human beha­
viour- Lugard's successors. Sir Percy Girouarfl and Sir Hesketfh 
Ball, consolidated his policy of minimal interference in. the af­
fairs of the'N&tivc Authorities, leaving each Emir very much 
master of his own house, Even so it was hot a straightforward 
or peaceful task, tn 1901 campaigns had. to be launched against 
Bida and Kontagora and later campaigns against xola. Abija and 
Keffi. Sokofco, Gwandu and Kano remained hostile and refused to 
abandon slave-raiding or, indeed, to have anything 4 • do with 
the new administrationr and it was in consequence of a provoca­
tive letter from Abdurrahman, the Sultan of Sokoto, that Lugard 
took the decision to bring feh& north under control by military 
action. In early 1903 he took Kano, Katsina and Gwandu, and on
10
14th March the So’koto army was defeated. Lugard made it clear 
that the old empire of Usman. Dan Fodio was at an end.
. . "The old treaties are dead/ you have Killed 
them... They (the Fulani] . . .  have by defeat lost 
their rule which has come" into the hands of the 
British .. .  Every Sultan and Smir and the princi­
pal officers of State will bo appointed by the High 
Commissioner throughout all this country." (1)
Although in 190G there was an uprising at Satiru where a whole 
company of British soldiers was murdered, Sokoto remained loyal 
and the uprising was soon orushed. By the end of 1906 the con­
quest of Northern .Nigeria was complete, ..
Two policy decisions were taken in  this period which 
were to b& o f great significance. The first was the establish­
ment of indirect rule which left most of the power in the hands 
of the traditional rulers and which in effect left the political 
system ana hierarchy as. it  vas under the Fulani Empire. The se­
cond was the agreement tugard made with the Sultan of Sokot© 
not to allow Christian missionaries to enter any Moslem Emirate 
without the Emir's consent, thus excluding the north from the 
influence of Christianity, the English language and western edu­
cation. • . . ■
XI. The South< the Yoruba Mad tho British.
Though there is evidence to suggest that early migra­
tions of the yoruba’s ancestors took place some time between
2,000 and 1,000 BC, legend dates the main migrations from about 
the eighth century AD by relating them, to the establishment of 
the Moslem religion at Mecca whence the Xorubas1 ‘mythical an­
cestor, oduduvm, was expelled by M s  Moslem neighbours for wor­
shipping idols. Oduduwa and his followers fled westwards and 
finally reached Ifc, where they settled. Oduduwa*s eldest son 
had ssven children, who founded the original sevon kingdoms.of 
the Yoruba. The seventh son-, Oranyan, founded the Oyo king­
dom - ..1 ^  ■ .
. The.social organisation of the forest belt peoples 
was generally small, based largely on local kinship ties and 
contained within small villages rarely exceeding a thousand in­
habitants. The most distinctive cultural trait of the Yoruba 
was their organisation into a system of towns, each ruled by an
1. Annual Report for Northern Nigeria, 1902, Appendix III , p.
105, m  Crowder, Michael, op. citv, p. 226.
2. Ankpo, Okai, op. c it ., p. 18.
oba> assisted by chiefs responsible for different aspects - 
defence, -judiciary, trade, etc. Frequently a group of towns 
whose rulers claimed common descent formed a ohiefdom. The sys­
tem of towns facilitated a growth of trade among the Yorubas 
themselves, and between them and the neighbouring northern .
groups. These contacts led to a wide diffusion of ideas and 
in no small measure contributed to the fact that in religious 
terms, the Yorubas are the least homogeneous of Nigeria's major 
tribes mid, in fact, the least united.
(The extent of the grasslands, to withi* fifty miles 
of the coast in parts of south-western Nigeria, o.-.^ -led tribes ' 
there to build up impressive lmgdoras; the two great ioroba states 
were oyo and ?enin, both purely African and neither stimulated 
to expansion toy external influences. The, sixteenth century saw 
the rise of the Oyo Empire which eventually controlled most of 
Yorubaland. At its zenith Oyo stretched from 2?ogo to Benin and 
from the mangrove swamps to tlie Mger; tout by the end of the 
eighteenth century it had effectively come to an end. Benin 
was-bounded to the east by the tfiger and to the west by Porto . 
Novo. It  was highly organised and, backed by a large array, con­
trolled substantial coastal areas. Its sculpture and bronzes of 
the time are world senov’ned. By the eighteenth century the . 
power of Benin, too, was spent, an important factor m  Yoruba 
^istory of this period was the long struggle with, the northern 
Moslems and the alliances and cultural links with the Middle . 
Belt peoples, Rivalry with the north scarred them deeply and 
distrust o f and bitterness towards the north have remained until 
the present time. .
■ in 1472 Portuguese explorers had discovered the coast
of Nigeria, and Ruy de Seguin«n commanding one of the expedi­
tions, had landed on the island of tegos, then a military out­
post of the kingdom of Benin. In 1485 another Portuguese trader, 
Alfonso d'Aveiro reached Bonin city. The arrival of the Portu­
guese marked the first stage in the complete re-orientation of 
the economy and in the profound, if gradual, revolution in West 
Afriaan history, . A shift of trade commenced to the Atlantic 
coast, which instead of being peripheral to commercial life be­
came its centre. The Portuguese developed their trade from the 
island of sao Thome and from Gwato, where they built a factory 
or trading station, mainly to trade with Benin;, what began pnn-
cipally as a trade in peppers had by 1510 become almost exclu­
sively a trade in slaves. . . ..
In 1553 the first English ship captain, Windham, vi­
sited Benin, which date marked the end of Portuguese monopoly 
of trade on the West Coast. Dutch, Spanish, Brandenbutgsrs, 
Portuguese and French competed for slaves but the English soon 
established themselves as leaders both in trade and in export 
of slaves. Benin and Lagos were centres of the traffic and 
Bonny, New calabar and Old Calabar grew up directly .m response 
to its needs. The Europeans obtained the ai- operation of the 
local peoples in order to ensure their supply, Little continued 
to be known of the interior and the course of the Niger itself 
was still unexplored. - .
. As slavery had been the vehicle of British influence
until the end of the eighteenth contusy, so anti-slavery was 
the means by which the British built up their control in Nige­
ria in the nineteenth. In 1807 Parliament passed an ftat prohi­
biting the s3ave trade to British subjects and from that time 
strenuous efforts were made to stamp out the traffic and to 
build up an alternative trade, which could be termed legitimate. 
With this aim in mind official and commercial attitudes towards 
local rulers altered, and their sovereignty, previously respect­
ed, .now.'became more liable to inroads, Britain was prepared to 
take over the authority of coastal chiefs in order no promote 
commerce. In 1820 there had been only 38 British merchantmen . 
trading in the Bights of Benin and Biafra, by 1840 there were 
134. Exports of palm oil increased from 200 tons in 1804 and 
13,.943 tons in 1834 to 23,285 tons in 1845. ^  Simultaneously 
Britain began to establish itself politically in Nigeria, in 183/ 
an anti-slavery patrol deposed the Regent in Bonny who had, con­
trary to treaty, imprisoned a British trader, and William Dappa 
Pepple was installed. Within a few years, so rapid was British 
encroachment that even Pepple complained of it . .
During this period explorers had been busy chatting 
the way to the interior. Exploration of the Niger can be dated 
from 1788 with the formation of the African association. In 1796 
Mungo Park reached the Niger River from Gambia and by 1824 the . 
expeditions of Denham, Clapperton and Oudney had revealed the
1. Crowder, Michael, op. a it ., p. 131.
possibilities of trade.
"It  was not until 1830 that the Lander bro­
thers proved that some of the 'rivers', which Euro­
pean vessels had visited for more than three cen- 
-buries, were in fact the mouths of the Niger, and 
only parts of the intricate system of waterways which 
made up its immense delta. Attempts wore at once 
made to develop trade with the hinterland along the 
course of the Niger and its main tributary, the Benue, 
but the mortality among the crews of tho vessels that 
. .ascended the rivers was so great that the idea was 
. abandoned fox a.while." (1)
in .1832 tho Queers and the Alburkah were the first British ships 
to reach the confluence of the Benue with the Niger. With Bri­
tish. naval supremacy established .on the Niger treraenc^'s and un­
expected possibilities were opened to British trade, the: 
prophylactic qualities of quinine had been demonstrated Dr 
Baikie's expedition 900 miles up the Niger to Yola in 1854.
partly as a reaction to events and partly as a respon­
se to colonial policy Britain steadily consolidated its influen­
ce. in 1849 a consul was appointed with headquarters on the 
Spanish island of Fernando po. The British invaded and captured 
Lagos in 1851, forcing Xostfko from his throne on grounds of 
slave -trading and restored his uncle, Akitoye, on the latter’s 
promise to abolish the traffic within M s  dominions; in 1852 
the British Government agreed to subsidise a small fleet of 
steamers, owned by Maegregor Laird, which were to form the basis 
of a regular mail service between Liverpool and West Africa..
This increased groafcly the number of traders coming to the area. 
By 1856 there were nearly 200 firms operating in the Delta. In 
1853 John Beecroft, the British Consul in the Bights of Benin 
and Biafiea, prosiding over a Court of Equity, had William 
ffepple sent into oxilo from .Bonny, and it was not until 1861 
that ho returned. In 1854 the Dahomeyane invaded Abeokuta. Bse- 
croft had issued ammunition to tho Egba army through the mis­
sionaries there and this saved the town from the otherwise bet­
ter equipped enemy - the first British intervention in the wars 
in Yorubaland, In 18S? factories or trading stations were estab­
lished at Aba and Onitsha on tho Niger and at Lokoja at the con­
fluence of the Benue with the Niger, in 1861 Docemo agreed to 
cede Lagos to Acting consul McKoskny in return for a pension of
1. Burns, Sir Alox, Sixty Years of British Rule, The Times, 
London, special Number on Nigeria, 29,9.60, p. 2.
£1,030 a year. The stated aims of the Foreign Office for this 
annexation were to secure the people of Lagos from slave trading, 
to develop legitimate trade with the towh. and to exercise a be­
neficial influence on the surrounding tribes. Henry Stanhope 
Freeman was appointed Governor of Lagos and he proceeded to an­
nex Palma, lekki and Badagry. In 1065 the Egba besieged Xkoro- 
du, which'was-strategic for Ibadan's supplies from the coast.
The new Lieutenant-Governor Glover despatched West Indian troops 
from Lagos who defeated the Egba, so extending British authority 
well beyond thu frontiers of Lagos. This period convinced the 
British that ij? the interior were to be opened up to legitimate 
trade, British authority would have to be paramount, and the , 
constant tribal wars terminated, control was further extended 
through, treaties: in the sixties and seventies these were airrad 
.a t  the abolition of slavery while in the eighties their .purpose 
•. -was to place territories under British protection.. :
- ■ Goldie., though extremely active in this regard, dad 
not confine himself to treaty making. . By 1078 there were four 
major companies-working on the Niger; Messrs Alexander Miller - 
‘ Brothers and company (Glasgow), James Piftnock and company. (Liver­
pool), West African Company (Manchester), and the Central A f r i ­
can tfrading company .{London). These firms ware not only in cut­
throat' competition with each other but were constantly threaten- 
•• ed by hostile laribea and foreign, particularly French, companies. 
Goldie pecsuadiad the four firms that the remedy for over-compe- . 
tifcion was merger and monopoly and they joined to form the United 
Africa company. Then by a price war Goldie succeeded in fore­
. ing the French companies out of business,
. . French and German interests were nonetheless increas­
ing in the ar^ ia> and their encroachment into the Niger, hinter­
lands constituted a threat to eventual British control. In 1883 
JUles Ferry, n known imperialist, became Prime Minister of France 
ahd in July, 1884 Germany declared a' protectorate over the ca~ 
meroons. It  was these opposing interests in West Africa which 
led directly to the Berlin conference of 1885, which, working 
on the-basis of effective occupation, recognised that British 
interests were paramount along the coast between Lagos and the 
csmeroons an^ l in the hinterland. Britain therefore formally 
proclaimed a protectorate over 'the territories on the line of 
coast between the British Protectorate of Lagos and tho right or
western bank of the Rio del Roy' and the 1 territories on both 
banks of the Niger, from its confluence with the river Benue at 
Lokoja to the sap. as well as the territories on both banks of 
the river Benue, from the confluence up to.and including I b i '-^  
Be ,’ cain now had no hesitation in involving itself 
further. The Oil Rivers Protectorate was set up, and adminis­
tered by a consul General at Calabar. Goldie's company, renamed 
the Royal Niger Company, received a Royal Charter granting it 
political authority au the hinterland of the Niger Delta and on 
both banks of the Niger and Benue. The Company established its 
headquarters at Asabg and set about securing a trade monopoly.
In 1833 the Oil Rivers Protectorate became fcti© Niger Coast Pro- • 
tectorate covering all territories which had.made treaties with 
Britain and were not! included within the scope of the Charter 
of the. Royal Niger Company. Delta middlemen reueuted this in­
creasing encroachment but they and anyone else who interfered, 
■with trade or continued slave trading or human sacrifices were 
dealt, with by military action. Such were Jaja of Opobo, deported 
in  1887,. Nana of the Benin River, defeated in 1894 and the Oba. . 
of Benin who had sanctioned the massacre of an unarmed British 
party, in 1B97 Benin, was defeated and the Oba,. Ovenramwen, de­
ported. So, too, the Brassmen, whe> revolted against the Royal 
Niger Company,, ware defeated in I8S5 at Kembe. In yorubaland 
the Lagos Government steadily extended control- In 1886 the 
British. Governor, Sir William Macgragor, managed to secure a 
precarious and teraporary peace, in 1890 a small British garri­
son- was placed at tlaro, In 1892 the Ijebu were defeated, an 
important, step in the. occupation of Yorubaland. .in 1833 sir . 
Gilbert carter set out on a trek, which when completed, left 
yorubaland ih effect a Protectorate. Agreements were concluded 
with, among others, xbadan and the Alafiin of Oyo &nd carter was 
able to end a sixteen year war between Xbadan and llorin.
. The eastern boundary of Nigeria was. settled with Ger­
many. There was, however, a serious threat.of conflict with . 
France over the western boundary which almost erupted in 1894 
over the so-called . ’Nikki steeplechase'. Although there had 
been agreement on a border between Dahomey and Lagos, this did 
not extend effectively for moxe than a hundred miles inland and
1. London Gazette, 5th June, 1885, in Crowder, Michael, op. 
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a large area of indefinition existed. The solution involved a 
r&ce to determine who could sign a treaty with the King of Nikki; 
Lugard defeated his French opponent, Dacoeur, by five days and 
secured the treaty for Britain. In 1898 an Anglo-French conven­
tion settled the boundary.
In view of these and other difficulties it was decid­
ed to cancel the Charter of the Royal Niger Company in 1899 and 
place the whole country under direct Government control. On 1st 
January, 1900 the north of Nigeria became the Protectorate of 
Northern Nigeria. The Niger Coast Protectorate and all the .lo­
yal Niger company's former territory as far north as Idah wera 
included in the new protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Lagos and 
its Yoruba protected states remained a colony under the Governor 
of xagos. The Emirate of Ilorin , the scene of so much warfare, 
was included in Northern Nigeria. The year 1906, wlien the Lagos 
Protectorate was merged with the protectorate of Southern Nige­
ria and the north was finally pacified, can be taken as narking 
the beginning of effective British administration. On 1st Ja­
nuary1, 1914 the whole country was amalgamated and superficially 
unity was given to Nigeria -
The effects of these changes on the social and eco­
nomic organisation of the peoples were profound. The coastal 
stages/ previously dependent on the savannah tribes, had become 
the. centres of trade and had. exploited this advantage for both 
commercial and political motives. -The slave trade had turaed 
small fishing villages, into sizeable towns of five to t£n thou*- 
sand people, and the increased emphasis on economic achievement 
rather than on traditional status began to alter the old bases . 
of political power. Tha suppression of the slave trade resulted 
in a further revolution in the economy, by basing it on trade.in 
the products of the forests. Free markets of a sise hitherto 
unprecedented-Wera created, internal tolls on the movement of . 
goods disappeared and.movement of .persons became increasingly 
safe, in the administrative centres the number of white offi­
cials grew steadily, the employment of hfnean clerks increased 
and other wage p-arners were attracted. Retail tradfc expanded, 
farmers began to ‘bring food to markets, rents were charged and 
barter was replaced by the use of currency. Roads were built 
and the construction of a railway commenced. From 1906 the 
breakdown of traditional structures was markedly more .rapid..
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The introduction of European goods stimulated new wants and 
wealth increasingly replaced traditional status as the basis of 
prestige/ a process which continued for the next fifty years.
Of almost equal significance as ths European explorers, 
traders and administrators were the missionaries. Early mission­
aries had a dual purpose, to replace tho slave traffic by legit- 
iraato trad© and.to convert Africans to Christianity. The church 
of Scotland, established itself at calabar, the Church Missionary 
Society in the Niger Delta and up the Niger River? and ths .. 
Methodists, Baptists, and the Church Missionary Society penetrated 
Yorubaland. This was a .zealous Christian movement, condemnatory 
of indigenous society and resolved to replace, it with. the. new 
religion.and a society based on its tenets. . The years 1850 to 
1865 saw a great expansion of missionary activity? for e?rample, 
the xotuba Mission established stations at Oyo, issyin, saki,. . 
OgbomoshQ, Ijaye, Ilaro and Isago and by 1851 most of the New . 
Testament was available in Yoruba. The missionaries spread intp 
remote area-s as well as malcing an impact in the towns» .. wherever 
they -went t^oy built schools, so bringing not only Christianity 
to. the people, but the English language and Western education,, 
which were to be most powerful factors of change. The English., 
language gave a common tongue to members of diverse tribes and 
education became a second now indicator of, status, .as the .
British occupied the country and created a demand foa? indigenous 
employees tho material benefits of Christian education became, 
obvious. It  was from the early converts that the first Nigerian 
educated.elite emerged. . .
. , . Most of this activity was among the Yoruba enabling , 
this people to surge ahead of the othor major groups and creating 
an imbalance vis-a-vis the isolated north that was to, have a , 
considerable political effect. •
XII. The Ibofl of- tho East. • . •
. Thi;ee theories of the origin of the ibos have been 
advanced. One denies migration to the east of Nigeria from else­
where {except in tho case of tho Onitsha Ibo); another tradition 
tells of migrations similar to those of the Yoruba and Hausa, 
but like the Ijaw, Ibibio and ffukun these groups were said to 
have moved along the valley of the Benue and then southwards? 
and a third places their origin in nojxh-easfc Africa, whence they
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migrated south-westwards into the central Congo, than through 
the'Caroeroons to south-east Nigeria, absorbing on thsir way suf­
ficient cultural traits of the Bantu peoples for their .language 
to assume a semi-Bantu character.
Though the Ibo have no tradition of political unity 
their language, culture and social structure show similar fea­
tures. The basic social unit was the extended family, the high­
est forrti of political organisation being the village group, con­
sisting of casters of villages each subject to an Qkpara, who - 
with the other Okparas administered the village group's affairs, 
Each group was completely autonomous. They developed neither 
monarchical forms of government nor elaborate state organisa­
tions; thicOc forests and the tsetse fly  played a large part in 
keeping political organisation small. The nearest approach to 
an ‘external integrating element was provided by the oracles 
which administered justice and had agents, in the villages for 
this purpose. Tradition lays great stress on individual achieve­
ment and theic small societies left much freedom to the indivi­
dual. Ibo women enjoyed an unusually high status, being allowed, 
to hoia personal property including the profits of trading, po­
pulation pressures and land hunger, however, forced many ibo- to 
migrate to the cities of the north and the west. There- they 
proved remarkably successful as clerks and. traders. They set­
tled in their own communities, particularly in the north, where 
they were forced to live in a ebon garis, or strangers' quarters.
. . Though contact vitft the European traders and missiona­
ries came later to the Ibos than to the Yorubas they reacted . 
swiftly to-the challenges of European culture, commerce and edu­
cation,, their individualism and relative lack of reverence for. 
traditional rulers.facilitating their progress. By 1900, al­
though the major areas of resistance to British authority had 
been overcome, other parts of the.eastern provinces continued 
to give trouble, and it took many punitive expeditions to bring 
the whole of iboland under British influence. The first ma^or . 
operation was against flro, guvvdian of the peoples of the east;. 
Later expeditions had to be launched against Ogoja, Qwern, Ibi~ 
bio, urhobo and Western Ibo and some parts of Iboland were not 
brought under British aontrol until as late as 1918,
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IV. Other Tribes.
While it is  correct to say that each of the three ma­
jor regions is dominated by one of the above-mentioned peoples, 
it  is inaccurate to say that each of the regions is inhabited 
by those peoples or that each region corresponds to an ethnic 
division. There arc, for instance, in addition to the Hausa 
and Fulani at least one hundred other linguistic groups, large 
and small, which make up fifty per cent of the population of the 
North, possibly the best known of these tribes is the Tiv of 
the Middle Belt, celebrated for their resistance to Fulani hege­
mony and their hostility to Islam. The broken country of the 
area helped them and numerous other small tribes to protect 
themselves against the great northern states. They were an ex­
pansive people, their fundamental unit being no larger than the 
compound,, and the British v©£e amazed, at the apparent state of 
anarchy in which they lived, To the east of the Hausa are the. 
Kanuri of Bornu, who, though Moslem by religion and culturally 
similar to the Hausa-Fulani, prevented Fulani occupation during 
the great Jihad, have remained distinct from them and speak a 
language of the central Sahara family unrelated to Hausa. other 
large, tribes are the Hupe, Idom, Igalla, Biram,. igbirra, Borgu . 
and Ilorin. They differ from the Hausa-ffulani, and in varying 
degrees have been connected with the soufclnrcrn people. -
. . . in Western Nigeria there are several tribes distin­
guishable from the dominant Yorubaa. in 1953, of a population 
of 6 .2  million, one million were Edo, a half-million Urhobo,
365,000 Western Ibo and oves 80,000 Ijaw. Most famous of these 
are the Edo which built up the powerful Benin Empire and* while 
related to tho Yoruba, have a stronger sense of political unity. 
The Oba was the . -seal point of the system and his role as reli­
gious head resulted in a proportionately highex number of pagans 
in this area-. . -
in the eastern half of the Eastern Region live, a ka­
leidoscope of smaller tribes speaking languages related to Ban­
tu. The Ijo of the Niger Delta foirm one of the main cultural 
minorities of the East. They originally acted as middlemen be­
tween the ibo and ibibio of the hinterland and the European, 
traders; and in slaving times they raided the Ibo villages and 
sold the men into slavery. They, like the other maan group, the 
Efik-Ibibio, who had also dominated the Ibo, suffered a sense of
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frustration when power passed to the latter.- - The 'Efik and Ibi- 
bibio speak mutually intelligible languages but their cultures 
differed in that the Efik were ruled by quasi-monarchical insti­
tutions, whereas the ibibio wore organised in much smaller units 
and ruled by elders.
These minorities were to-play a significant if not al­
ways consistent part in the political development of the Regions 
and the Country. One result of their presence was that they 
formed buffers between the three major groups, which for some 
time prevented their hostility becoming too sharply defined* . 
.Further, arising out of fear of domination, they exerted pares- 
sure for the creation of more states and formed political par­
ties to this end. .
c. Political and constitutional Development, 1914 " 1 9 6 7 ,
x. Prom Amalgamation tea World war 21 . • . "  ............ .. - - .
: . On 1st January, 1914 the whole country was amalgamat­
ed into the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria, the former. Nor­
thern and Southern Protectorates becoming the Northern and Sou­
. them Eroviacss of Nigeria, while Lagos was styled the Colony of 
Lagos- Lugard was appointed the first Governor-General. Again­
st the advice of others who also teiew the country, he decided to 
maintain the distinction between North and South, administration 
being effectively rationalised under Lieutenant-Governors. This 
served only to increase the differences between the.two regions^ 
which was further aggravated by the success of indirect rule in 
the North and its failure in the South. According to Lugards
• . . "The system of Native administration in the se- 
. parato Government of Northern Nigeria had been based - 
on the authority of the Native Chiefs. The policy 
of the Government was that these Ghiefi should govern 
. their people, not as independent but as dependent Ru­
lers. The orders of Sovammcmt are not conveyed to 
the people through them, but emanate from them in ac­
. cordanco, whore necessary, with instructions received
through the Resident, While they themselves are oon- .. 
trolled by Government in matters of policy and of im­
portance, their people are controlled in accordance 
with that policy by themselves."  (1)
. A system that depended fundamentally on. a fulcrum of
1. Report by Sir J7.D. Lugard on the Amalgamation of Northern 
and Southern Nigeria 1912 - 19, (1919), in Crowder, 
Michael, op. c it ., p. 245. '
authority could not be a groat success in the West where the.
Oyo was not. in the powerful position of the Emir, and was irre- . 
levant in the loosely organised societies of the Bast, where 
the Warrant chiefs were very unpopular and backed by little tra­
ditional authority, Lugard decreased the already limited powars 
of the legislative Council by restricting its authority to La­
gos and replaced it-with an unwie-UiY kiyenan council, consist­
ing of thirty Europeans and six Hiigftrj.&t'S, three nominated from 
the North and three from the South,. functions were pure­
ly  advisory and as it met only .once a y*;W’ it proved of little 
value. .
• World War I saw Bigorian troops participating in the
Cameroons» Niger, Togo and in East Africa. allied war propa-. 
ganda which stressed the fight for democracy and the rights of 
small nations, and the British promise of eventual self-govern­
ment to India stimulated the hopes of a small group of nationa­
lists, British-educated Ybrubaa centred in Lagos. The ideas of 
men like Edward Wilmot Blyden, a West Indian living in Liberia, 
j .  Africanus B o rton, a Gold Coast < tor, J .p , Jackson, a Libe­
rian. and of W.B. Da. Bois, Marcus Garvey and President. Woodrow 
Wilson/, began to filter through to Nigeria. Although Lugard 
had created a Nigerian unit, and some soon began to identify 
themselves with it, the upsurge of nationalism after the war • 
really originated as a protest movement promoting greater parti­
cipation in  the public affairs of the colony. In 1920 some Ni­
gerian lawyers, doctors and merchants from Lagos and Calabar 
participated It* a conference held in Accra by a,body known as 
the National congress of.British West Africa, This Congress 
considered the: whole of British West Africa its. domain and aim­
ed a t .diverting attention from the indirect rule policy and plac­
ing control in tha.hands of legislative councils. A delegation 
to the Secretary of State was unsuccessful.
. For the first times, however, the British authorities, 
conceded the principle of elections. Xn 1922 Sir Hugh Clifford 
recast the Legislntive Council to consist of forty-six members, 
ten of whom were Nigerians, of whom four were to. be elected, 
three from, Lagos and one from calabar, by adult males with an in­
coma of £100 a year. It  was to legislate for the Colony and the 
Southern Province while the Governor continued to legislate for 
the Northern Province. The outcome of the Accra conference.and
of these alterations xn the Council was the formation of the 
first political parties m  Lagos - the Nigerian National Demo- . 
cratic party, led by Herbert Macaulay, and an opposition, con­
servative, Peoples' Union.. The former, whose objective was the 
enfranchisement of the people of Lagos, won all three seats and 
continued to dominate the politics of the Colony for the next 
decade. Neither party sought nor received popular support, 
their membership remaining small and their interests sectional.
A further event of importance in the twenties was the founding 
in London in 1925 of fee West African students' Union by a Ni­
gerian , Ladipo Solanke. .
- in the administrative field, the early thirties saw 
Sir Donald ca^eron, the Governor, attempt to reform the system 
of indirect rule which was becoming increasingly retrogressive.
In-tb©-Bast he reorganised the Native Authorities to correspond. . 
■*d.tV >e so-called live units of government, .usually small collec- 
ti'st f  hamlets and villages- To emphasise Nigerian unity he 
abolished the posts of Lieutenant-Governor of Northern and Sou­
thern Nigeria. A resurgence of nationalism occurred in  the late 
thirties with the advent of a new generation of men which looked 
beyond^the tangle of Lagos politics. • Nigerians, other than Bri­
tish-educated YorubaS/ and tovms other than Lagos, began to take 
an interest in polities. • . • • ■ - -
. ”a  aew leadership , . .  came forward and was . .
provided largely by American-trained graduates...
American education produced a different type of
graduate, whose standard of education was much
lower than that of the British-trained, but who ■
■ did not have imparted to him an automatic sense 
: of belonging to a privileged elite, - • . ■
But the American-educated Africans had a dif­
ferent attitude to the masses, and were impatient •
- with thn cautious approach of the old. elite. i f  
their education was crude and lacking in subtlety,
. . this of itself allowed them to communicate with a 
mass African audience in a new styled' (1)
One suoh graduate was an Xbo named Nnamdi Aaikiwe, who returned 
in. 1937 having served a journalistic apprenticeship in the Gold 
Coast. He founded the West African Pilot which for twenty years 
was to be the leading organ of nationalist opinion, in 1934.a
a group.of educated young radicals led by man like H.O. Davies,
Dr J.C . Vaughan, Samuel Akinsanya and Ernest xkoli bad founded 
the Lagos Youth Movement, In 1937 under Davies' influence it 
was renamed the Nigerian Youth Movement, as.its objectives it . 
had the promotion of better understanding and co-operation be­
tween tribes in order to unite them, independence for Nigeria 
within the British Empire, and employment opportunities equal 
to those enjoyed by non-Nigerians - Aaikiwe threw his weight be­
hind the organisation and by bringing Xbo and Ibibio people into 
it, helped to transform it from a local Yoruba-Lagos affair into 
a widespread southern organisation. In 1938 it  won the Lagos 
town council elections and the three elective seats in the Le-. 
gislative Council, thus ending Macaulay’s political dominance . 
•in Lagos. Its newspaper/ the Service, later called the kaily 
Service/ joined the West African Pilot in the spread of the na­
tionalist. gospel. In 1939 the Higerian Union of Students was . • • 
formed at the Abeokuta Granular School, The increased partici­
pation of educated Nigerians in politics caused concern as to 
their future role in the country. It  was the War which was fi ­
nally to decide that role, • ■ . , ■. . . 
IX. grom World Var XI to Independence, • . .
■ - . it  is  the era when Nigeria advanced from : 
the first experience of Ministerial government to . . 
full independence, the era of the development of a- .
■ ..rigid ffederaJ system, and the era when Nigerians .
•• showed-such aptitude for .self-government, and for .
political negotiation, that independence has been 
the culmination loss of a politiaal struggle than 
of a constitutional and administrative exorcise." (1) .
This statement, correct bo far as it goes, is not the whole sto­
rY-
World War XX did a great deal to intensify nationalist 
ferment. . Large numbers of Nigerians saw action, and came into . 
contact with ordinary Europeans who were different from the pri­
vileged colonial administrators. More important was the war 
propaganda against German r&eialism and Japanese imperialism, the 
signing of the Atlantic Charter, and Clement Attlee’s assurance 
to a Conference of the West African Students’ Union in London 
that the Charter applied to Africa. The War made independence
1. Williams, David, End of the Era of the Big Three, The Times. 
London, Special Nujnber. on Nigeria, 29.9.<50, p. iv.
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inevitable and accelerated its realisation, on the other hand, 
tribalism, Nigeria's ever-present reality, made the possible 
success of such independence doubtful and in fact served to de­
lay its realisation. Through good sense and compromise it was 
submerged in hints for independence, but tribal ambitions and an­
tagonisms were never resolved,
a. Parties.
i . ncnc and the East,
Tribal emotions were aroused in 1941 in a quarrel with­
in the Nigerian Youth Movement over the candidature of Samuel 
Akinsanya for a seat in the Legislative Council, zik and his 
followers withdrew and it became an entirely Yoruba organisation 
and ‘ultimately degenerated into desuetude1, ^  thus impsding 
southern political unity. On 26th August, 1344 Zik launched his 
own party, the National Council of Nigeria, and the Cameroons - . . 
(NCNC) with himself as Secretary and Herbert Macaulay as Presi­
dent.. This party added considerable impetus to the movement to­
wards independence» The NCNC started as a national party but 
through' circumstances evolved into an ibo, Eastern party: .first­
ly, .the split ic, the Nigerian Youth Movement had serious tribal 
connotations and left the Ibo with a feeling of resentment;, se­
condly, the Ibo people in the East and in their separate commu­
nities in the North and the West,in an effort to catch up edu­
cationally with the Yoruba people, began to form mutual benefit 
associations which then tended to federate in organisations like 
the pan-Ibo Federal tJnion. In 1948 as a result of ill-feeling 
between. Yoruba and ibo the Ibo state Union was established, in 
the 1951 4j.eat:iong SiJc was successful in Lagos, but the Action 
Group waa able to exclude him from the Federal Assembly. Again, 
this seemed to the ibo a betrayal of unity for the sake of Yoru­
ba tribal interests, an<3 bo Pan-Ibo pressures gained strength 
within the party. Of the three major parties, however, the NCNC 
did remain the most genuinely national.
i i . Action Group and the West.
. The party that took the lead in the western Region hacl
its origin in a society formed m  1945 m  London called the Egbe
1. Azikive, Nnamdi, The Development of Political Parties an Ni­
geria, Office of fche commissioner in the United Kingdom 
for the Eastern Region of Nigeria.* August, 1957, p. 8.
./
Omo Oduduwa (Society of the Descendants of Oduduwa). it was 
founded by Obafemi Awolowo, an Ijabu Yoruba, who had opposed Zik 
in the Nigerian Youth Movement. He returned in 3.947 and estab­
lished the first branch in Nigeria, it originated as a cultural 
organisation but soon became the focus of pan-yoruba feeling.
In 1951 Awolowo transformed it into a full-scale political par­
ty, the Action Group (AG). The Obas realised that their only 
hope of survival lay in moving with the tide of political change, 
and co-operated, in the late forties a Lagos ..lawyer, chief Bode 
Thomas, began to expound a policy which, according to Zxk, was 
■a banner of extreme r a c ia lis m '/^u n t il  1955 when,.for the be­
nefit of public opinion, it took on a more national character.
iii . NPC and the North.
The nationalist movement made far less impact on the 
politically-backward-north than on the- south. -The Moslem rulers, 
feared for their own positions, and the North's fear of southern 
domination, was accentuated by- their ressntment of southerners, 
ptirticularly the ibos in their midst, who held the best cleri­
cal and technical posts. Most educated Northerners, the hard . 
core of whom came from Katsina Training College, had.neither the 
inclination nor the power to challenge the traditional order, 
and therefore decided to associate with the Northern rulers to 
present a united front- She Emirs who appreciated the advantag­
es of co-operating with them, were receptive. .
By force of personality, as well as by virtue of mem­
bership of -the foremost Fulani family of Sokoto, (direct descen­
dants of Othraan dan Fodio), Ahmadu Bello, the Sarflauna of Soko- 
to., emerged as leader. He was ably assisted by Alhaji Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa. who ha<5 graduated from teaching. In 1949 the Nor­
thern peoples' Congress (NJ?C) was formed and in the discussions 
with Macpherson and the elections that followed it became.a 
political party, Moslem and conservative m  inspirations In his 
book, My Life, Ahmadu Bello explained the NPC's views on the 
southern Nigerians and the unity of Nigeria:
" . .  < We called it [jSTKi] Northern because we t 
.wanted to unite the Northern people and at that time 
we were not looking much beyond our own borders.
. . .  We all found it [Lagos] very strange . . .  .
1. Aaikiwe, Nnamdi, op. ait ., p. 18.
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and . . .  alien to oar ideas of life and we found 
. • that the Memberis for the other Regions might well 
belong to anothor world so far as we were concern­
ed." (1 ) ■ 
Ai'ter his delegation had been booed in Lagos in 1953 he wrote 
that there were 'aginations in favour of secession1.
.. "x must say it looked very tempting, we
were certainly 'v iable '..*
: There wexey however, two things of the most
[: vital importance in our way. The first was that 
the greater part of the revenue of Nigeria comes
- from customs duties collected on the coast on all 
: ' goods brought ovar the wharves *..
The second iliffioulty was similar to it*
. . Would it  be possible to sand our goods down to the 
coast for . shipment by rail or road, and what gua- 
■i . ranteo would there be that they would get there at 
a ll? ... . .
i! We had t\o sentimental illusions about
. leaving the others: they had acted in such a way -
i> - that it was abundantly clear to us that they .would .
;l .sooner see the bad? of us; but what about this . -
. |. transport difficulty?" •. . (2) . .
iv. Other parti es. ■
i! There were, numerous inor parties, some founded on an
icteology, some based on a tribe. Of these only examples can be 
gkven- In the Worth there, was a progressive opposition party 
gboupad around Arcdnu Kano called the Northern Elements Progres­
sive Onion (NSPU) , antJ a Onited Middle Belt Congress,, led by 
3:-.s. Tarka, and supported by she Tiv peoples which pressed for 
aji Middle Belt region .separate from the North, m  the south 
'.ideological' opposition parties included, the United National 
Ipdependence Party and Dr Chike Obi's Dynamic Party. Others, 
formed for the purposie of representing minority interests and 
advocating separate regions included the Calabar-Ogoj e-Rivers 
State Movement and the Mid-West State Movement. .
b1. issues. -
! . • The first concerned the timing of independence. The 
qhief element of delay was the lack of mass political organisa­
tion and administrative experience in tho North, as a.result of 
which Northern leaders feared that m  an independent Nigeria the 
south would dominate, 'the NPC incurred the hostility of the
1. Bello, Sir Ahmadu, My Life, Cambridge, 3962, p. 85. 
51. Ib id ., pp. 135 and 136.
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NCNC and the AC. as rfc succeeded in retarding the pace of the . 
movement towards independence. The second concerned the status 
of Lagos. The NPC and NCNC eo-operafced in an effort to turn ' 
the most developed Yoruba city .into a federal 'territory.. This 
helped prepare the way for their later alliance and at the same 
time served to keep the southern parties apart.. AG resentment 
against the decision to federalise Lagos led the party to take 
a strong emotional stand against the Colonial office and in- . 
creased the influence of the party1s more radical members. The 
third; the question of minorities? remained a live issue until 
independence. The problem of . safeguarding minority interests 
and of the creation of new states found the AG and NCHC agaiu 
opposing the NPC. None were created, tout AG support for such. . 
states in the North and East and KCJSC support tor them in this 
■West resulted in their fa d in g  electoral support in these areas. 
The fourth issue revolved around the division of power. between 
the centre and.the regions. . The NCNC proposed a strong central 
government? the AG preferred strong regional governments,-. and the 
NPC wanted as much power for the regions as was possible. Apart 
from the division of power the question of revenue allocation .. 
was vitally important, in general it  can be said that regional­
ism triumphed, . . . . - . .
c, ' conferences and Constitutions. .
. ■ in 194$, without consultation, the- Governor, Sir Ar­
thur Richards, produced the first of the constitutions, it pro­
vided for a central legislature of 45 for all Nigeria; 28 were 
to be Siberians, of whom 4 were to. be elected. A regional Souse 
of Assembly was established in each of th© regions, which had 
advisory powers only. In the North thore was to be a House of 
Chiefs. On the one hand a unifying effect was achieved by ,
bringing the North into the central legislature; on the. other, 
it formally introduced the regional concept and established the 
basis of a very unwieldy federation with ono region twice the 
size in area and population of tho other two. These proposals, 
were attacked on every side by Nigerian nationalists and the 
NCNC led protests and sent a delegation to Britain. The secre­
tary of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creeeh-CJones, told them 
to return and try to make it work.
Sir John Macpherson replaced Sir Arthur Richards in
28
April, 1949 and immediately called a series of national and re­
gional conferences to shape a new systcr;, These discussions 
made Nigerians confront the difficult problem of harmonising 
their divergent interests and the three years in which the new 
constitution was negotiated ware dominated by tribal national­
ism. In January, 1952 Macpherson' a constitution came into ef­
fect, It established a Council of Ministars consisting of 18 
members, of whom 12 were to be Nigerians and 6 officials* The 
Nigerians were to be nominated by the Regional- Legislatures, 
each region nominating the same nuitiber, &  House of Representa­
tives was also establishedt consisting of 142 meitibers, of whom 
136 were to be Nigerians. A House o£ Chiefs was introduced in 
the-west and the regional legislative bodies were given legisla­
tive powers on a limited number of topics, subject to the appro-, 
val of the Governor, in Nigeria’s first general election, the 
NPG sweet the North, the NCNC took the East with a large ma3ori- 
ty and the AG won the West with 49 out of 80 seats- . - .
• ‘The constitution was destined.for a short life. 'There 
was no ministerial responsibility; two of the parties wanted 
.greater regional autonomy? and a wore precise definition of the 
functions of the regional and central, governments was required. 
The NCNC found- itself in an intolerable position^ since its lea­
ders were excluded front the national legislature and, owing to 
an internal crisis, there was a minority government in the East. 
It  was the AG, however, which precipitated the final breakdown- 
On 1st April, 1953 Anthony Bnahoro, an AG backbencher, intro­
duced a b ill  demanding- self-government by 1956. The NPG opposed 
it, leading to an AG and NCNC .walkout. The Northern mergers 
were booed and insulted bytago.3 aroWds, and they seriously con­
templated secession. The position further deteriorated when . 
Awolowo announced a tour to Kano. The Resident prohibited this 
rather tactless move but enough tension had been generated to 
lead to communal rioting in the North in which 36 people were 
killed and 277 injured, according to the official count. Short­
ly afterwards the Northern legislative bodjes passed an eight . 
point resolution which, in effect, demanded dissolution of the 
Federation, one point required that each Region 'shall have 
comp lete legislative and executive autonomy' with respect to 
all matters except Defence, External Affairs, Customs and a 
West African Research Institute for winch a non-political cent-
ral agency would be responsible. ^
Against this background, a conference in London in 
1953 was to prove surprisingly successful. A federal constitu­
tion was agreed in. which residual powers were to be transferred 
to the regions as distinct from the centre as had been the case 
under the old constitution. The bitter issue of the status of 
Lagos was decided by arbitration which went in favour of federa- 
lising the city. The Nigerian police force was to be federalism 
ed. When ch® resumed conference began m  Lagos in 1954 the AG 
demanded that the right of secession be included in the consti­
tution. This was rejected. Each region was to have its own 
public service, revenue allocation was to be on the basis of de­
rivation, and the Market Boards were regionalised, thus dividing 
Nigeria into three 'Economic units. On 1st October, 1954, there­
fore, a new constitution Which declared Nigeria to be a federa­
tion, came into existence. The counail of Ministers, to be com­
posed. of 10 Nigerians and 3 ex officio Ministers was given res­
ponsibility for the formulation and execution of- policy. In*- 
stead of Ministers being nominated by the regional assemblies, 
they were to be nominated by the leader of the party which gained 
the majority of seats in that region in the federal elections.
The House of Representatives was increased to 184 members, half 
of wliom were to be Korfcherners. xn the elections the ¥PC won ' 
over 80 of the 92 seats in the North, the NCKC won the East with 
ease and managed to defeat the AG in the West. Thus the £?C&C 
had the right to choose S Federal Ministers, while the NPC had 
the largest nuttiber of seats in the House of Representatives.
This made coalition inevitable, and even though it  required some 
compromise of the two parties it was this that made federal co­
operation possible.
Xn 1955 Sir Jamas Robertson succeeded Sir John Macplier- 
son and he proved to be an excellent choice to lead Nigeria to 
independence. Xn 1956 the Queen paid a highly successful visit 
to Nigeria. At the 1957 London Conference, arrangements were 
concluded to enable the East and West to achieve self-government 
later in the year, it was also decided that a House of chiefs . . 
should be set up in the East and that on the dissolution of the 
House of Representatives towards the end of 1959 there should be 
two federal legislative houses, a Senate and a House of Bepre-
1. Bello, Sir Ahmadu, op. c it ., p. 144,
sentativee. Membership o£ the latter was to 136 enlarged to 320, 
elected on the basis of one member for each 100,000 people. “The 
Senate was to consist of 12 members from each region and -the Ca­
rrier oons, 4 from Lagos and 4 special members, h fiscal commissioi 
was appointed to restudy the earlier decision on revenue alloca­
tion.
When the conference was resumed in 1958 it  was agreed 
that the North should become self-governing m  March/ 1959 and 
that should the Federal Parliament pass a resolution asking for 
independence, Her Majesty's Government would wake the necessary 
arrangements. The fiscal coawission recommended, on the basis . 
of sensible new criteria, the establishment of a pool of federal­
ly-collected revenue to be shaded as follows: to the North 4Q5S, 
to the West 24%, to the East 31% and to the Southern Cameroons 
5%. . ' ' . • . .
' . The outcome of the elections Which, took place in 1959
was as follows: .
North Bast West Lacros Total
NPC and allies 135 1+ 7** ■ - 143
HCNC/NEPtr . . a 50 21 ' 2 89
AG 25 14 ' 33 1 73
Independents - 6* ' - 1 - 7
174 73 62 3 ■ 312
* Declared subsecjuently for ft PC.
+ Mabolaje Grand Allianae. .
**  Niger Delta Congress.
After a week o£ negotiation, the NCNC decided not to co-operate 
with the AG, but.in accordance with a pre-election understanding 
to form a coalition with the NPC. Abubakar Tafawa Salewa, who 
was knighted, beaame the first Prime Minister. Zik opted for 
the uninfluential post of President of the senate. Soon after 
independence, however, on 16th November, he became Nigeria ‘ s 
first indigenous Governor-General. Awolowo became Leader of the 
Opposition. Ahmadu Bello preferred to remain Premier of the 
North rather than to join in federal .politics. The Prime Minis­
ter introduced the motion asking for independence at the January
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session and it was approved unanimously, on 29th June the Unit­
ed Kingdom Parliament passed the necessary legislation granting 
Nigeria fully responsible status. On 1st October, I960 Nigeria 
celebrated xts independence. - .
In accordance with, a decision of the united Nations 
General Assembly, and after a plebiscite held in the northern 
section of the British-administered trust territory of the catne- 
roons, both the northern and southern sections of the Cameroons 
were administratively separated from Nigeria on let october, and 
remained so until their future was settled by a further plebis­
cite: the southern part elected to join Cameroun, and the nor­
thern part to join Nigeria, where it became known as the Sardau- 
na province of Northern Nigeria. {Ehe NCNC accordingly altered 
its name to the National convention of Nigerian citizens.) 
in .- 'Prom Independence to Seosasion. • • - •••. -
It was now to be seen whether, left to their own de­
vices, the Nigerian peoples would be able to overcome their dif­
ferences and find sufficient in common to become a Nigerian . 
people- Although the three main cultural groups were engaged 
in a complicated and precarious balancing act hope of success 
was high, Unfortunately, however, ‘the 'political frame' left
by the British proved unable to withstand the centrifugal pres- 
• - (11 ■ . sures -of the 'political facts' 1 Yet again i'c was tribalism
which lay at the core of these 'political facts' and which erupt­
ed in a. series of crises which were eventually to tear the Fede­
ration asunder« -
. During this period a new state, the Mid-West, was carv­
ed out of the eastern non~¥orjiba part .of the Western Region, 
against the opposition of the AG. On 1st October, X9S3 Nigeria 
became a Republic with 213c as its first President. The Tiv peop­
les' hostiltiy to Kaduna continued and serious conflict flared 
up on occasions, notably in February and October, 1964. In 1965 
at the Lagos University, a federal institution, an Xho was re­
placed by a Yorufra as v'ice-Chancellor causing yet another serious 
tribal quarrels 'this story is one of hidden politics and bare­
faced tribalism'. ^  .
1. Post, K.W.ov, op, c it ., p. 29.
2. Africa Confidential, No. 17, .27.8.65, p. S.
. corruption spread among both politicians and civil
servants, and changes of party allegiance, misuse of public . 
funds, lavish spending and large motorcars increased the cyni­
cism of the populace about politicians and politics. The work 
of the Federal Parliament not only became increasingly irrele­
vant to the needs of the country but also decreased xn volume, 
it was said by Joseph Tarka that 'this honourable House has creat­
ed two records. The first is a record for short sittings and- the 
second is a record for long vacations, plus expenses paid '. ^  . 
A groundswell of popular discontent mounted as it became appa­
rent that it was only the politicians who wore getting richer. 
Unemployment spread steadily and led to a number of serious strik­
es, -the most effective of which were the Republic Day strike of 
1963 and the Joint Action committee's thirteen-day strike m  
May and June, 1964, both of which were handled incompetently by 
the Federal Government. Amongst the politically conscious, and 
some of. the military, disgust became the prevalent emotion arous­
ed by politics and politicians, saepticism grew about the whole 
democratic system and with it a yearning for a strong, incorrup­
tible dictator.
a- crisis .in the. Western Ramon, 1962. .. •
Fox a year and a half the country progressed peaces 
fully enough. Then in May, 1952 the AS split iu two and the Fe­
deral Government decided to take advantage of the situation f 
One AG group was led by the party leader, Awolowo. He had be­
come convinced that the future lay not in the.existing form of 
appeal to the electorate, but in a more radical, socialist policy 
which would find increasing favour among the people as their dis­
appointment with the slow rata of socio-economic growth under 
the Federal Government inoroasad. Supported by the younger men, 
he began to emphasis© the. 'democratic socialism' of the AG pro­
gramme and to try to spread this policy to the Northern Region,
The other group was led by Chlof Samuel Ladoke Akintoia, deputy 
leader of the party and premier of the west. Akintoia, a weal­
thy chief and a moderate, having a groat affinity with the res­
pectable and aristocratic rulars of the NPG, felt that the AG
1. House of Representatives Debates (hereinafter referred to 
as BRD), Fifth Session, Vol. 16, 23 - 28 September, 1964„ 
p. 143. ■ ■ ■
bad no future in the political wilderness and should join the 
federal coalition- Backed by.the businessmen of the party ho 
opposed the drift towards socialism and the campaign at the na­
tional level which, he 'believed, could only draw the fire ot 
the Federal Government on the West. Apart from this difference 
over policy, a personal rivalry and animosity developed between, 
the two leaders, particularly since Awolowo on a number of oc­
casions overruled decisions reached in the Western Cabinet on 
regional affairs. Akintola18 view was that Awolowo's place was 
leading the opposition in the Federal Parliament and not inter­
fering in the day-to-dwy running of the Region. Dissension came 
into, the open at the annual party convention in Jos in April, 
1962, and the party finally split towards the end of May, when, 
at a meeting of the Federal Executive Committee, which Akintola 
refused to attend, it was decided that Akintola should be remov­
ed from the offices of deputy leader of the party and premier of 
the Region, a majority of members of the House of Assembly went 
to the Ibadan High Court to swear an affidavit reaffirming lack 
of confidence in  Akintola and finding him guilty of maladminis­
tration, anti-party activities and indiscipline. The Governor 
of the Region dismissed him on the grounds that he no longer en­
joyed the confidonee of the majority of the House of Assembly.
To replace him the &G appointed Alhaji Eawuda soroye Adegbenro, 
the first Moslem to be a Premier in a southern region. Akinto la 
announced that ho had. written to the Federal Prime Minister ask­
ing .that he request the Queen to dismiss the Governor and in­
forming him that he intended to test the legality, of his dismis­
sal in court. The disintegration of the Regional Government be­
came obvious when rioting broke out in the western House and the
police, acting under Federal Government instructions, cleared the 
mHouse and locked it. v ;
1. An official statement on the proceedings of the House reads: 
"Chief Qdebiyi (Minister of Finance and Leader of the 
House) was about to move the first, business motion of the 
day when Mr. E .O. Oke . . .  jumped up, raised an alarm and 
flung a chair across the floor of the House. . .
. Mr. F. Ebubedike . . .  seized the Mace and smashed it on 
. Mr. Speaker's table. .
Mr. S.A. Adeniya . . .  then seized a chair and hit the _ 
Minister of Trade and industry . . .  on the head... At this 
stage members of the Akintola faction assisted by the NCitfC
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The NPC and NCNC decided to exploit the division of 
their opponents and strike a powerful blow at the AG. On® rea­
son was simply a dislike, oven, hatred, felt by some of their lea­
ders towards Awolowo and hia party and another, fear and distrust 
of his new policy of appealing to the socially discontented ele­
ments throughout the country. Both had an equal interest in 
thwarting his plans, after the rioting in the Western House, 
which had the tacit support of the Federal Government, Sir Abu~ 
bakar introduced a b ill declaring a state of amorgtmcy m  the 
West. He said that no responsible government could allow this 
to continue 'without talcing adequate measures to ensure that 
there is an early return to the Region of peace, order and good 
Governm ent'.^ Awolowo maintained, however, that this was ‘a 
calculated, premeditated attempt on the part of the Prime Minis­
ter and his Cabinet to try, if  they could, to castrate the Action 
Group, to disturb the welfare of the people o f Western Nigeria 
who have always been looked upon as the foos o f the ^
and pointed out that the disturbance m s  started by Akintola's 
supporters. Eh© motion was passed by 232 votes to 44. A 
state, of emergency was declared, the Regional Government suspend­
ed and Senator Dr H .A . Majekodunmi, the Federal Minister of Heal­
th, appointed Administrator. Step by step the AG was crippled. 
Awolowo and a number of other leaders were.restricted. Then in 
Septeitiber, 1963 the trials of 30 opposition members began. Awo­
lowo wao found guilty of treasonable felony and sentenced to ten 
years imprisonment; another AG leader, Anthony Enahoro, was sen­
tenced to fifteen yeara (later reduced to seven}. Meanwhile the 
Coker Commission was appointed to investigate the AG1s financial 
malpractices. It  found Awolowo had not conformed to the stan­
dards of practice required but absolved Akintola of any guilt.
Opposition, smashed chairs and tables, police had to use 
tear gas to disperse tits scuffling. Mr. speaker then sus­
. ponded sitting for 2h hours. The House reassembled at
11.30 am. .
But members of tho Akintola faction . . .  assisted by a num­
ber of Opposition members started smashing chairs m  their 
bid to prevent tho mooting." ' West Africa/ 2 .6 .62, p. G07.
1. HRD, 9 April - 29 May, 1962, p. 1101. ’
2. Xbid., p. 1103, - •.
3. ibid., p. 1119.
Findings of malpractices, although correat, could have been 
proved in other Regions as well. The as rejected there as Awe- 
lowo had been prevented from attending the hearings and giving 
evidence.
. in July, 1962 the Federal Supreme Court found that . . 
the Western Governor had exceeded his powers in removing Akinfco- 
la from the premiership without: an actual vote in the House of 
Assembly, in May, 1963 the Privy Council quashed this and up­
held Adegbenro's appointment.^ The Western House of assembly 
then passed a retroactive Lsw amending the Constitution with ef­
fect from 1960, and removing the Governor's right to dismiss the 
Premier from office? and in June. 1963 th<? Federal Parliament 
nullified the Privy Council verdict. The Governor of the.West, 
an Awolowo supporter, was retired and replaced by one with NCng 
-sympathies} and to •complete the dismemberment of the old Action 
Group empire, the new Mid-Wost State was created an rtiid-1963 out 
of the non~Yoruba elements in the West.*; ' '* rthere was not the 
slightest doubt that the Mid-West state was. created not soxely
to allay the fears of the minorities in that area but to neutra-
(3)liae Action Group influence them 1 ' ' .
On 1st January, 1963 th« state of emergency was ended 
and without an. election Akin tola emerged as the leader of a new
■ party, the United Peoples* Party (UPP), a pro-NrC splinter, of 
the AG, which joined with the SONG to form the Regional Govern- 
manfc, with Akintola as Premier. .Thus th© AG was effectively pre­
cluded from controlling a region an which the party had the sup­
. port of the majority of voters. Despite all that had happened 
to Awolowo and the AG, the party proved its strength by winning 
to tagos Municipal Elections late in 1962. Th© attempt at mak­
1. Section 33 (10) of tho Constitution of Western Nigeria (m ­
. geria (Constitution) Order in couneil) laid down that the
Governor had the power to dismiss tho Regional premier 
when ’it  appears to him that tho premier no longer com­
mands the support of the majority of the meinbers of the 
House of Assembly’ . The Privy Council hold that the words 
. 'it  appears 'ho him' provided 'no limitation as to the -ma­
terial on which he was to base his audgemont or the con­
tacts to which he might resort for the purpose'. Adegben- 
ro versus Akintola, Judicial Committee of the Privy Coun­
cil, Apjvoal Cases, 1963, p. 615.
2. Schwarz, W-, Tribalism and polities m  Nigeria, World Today,
Vol. 22, November, 1966, p. 464.
3. Ankpo, okoi, op. c it ., p. 94.
ing democracy work in Nigeria had suffered its first severe set­
back, one Jrom which it was never given time to recover,
b. Crisis over the Census, 1963 - 1964. .
It was not, however, the destruction of the AG which 
enabled the N&c to maintain its hegemony, but its announced po­
pulation lead - a lead which southerners, both Xbo and Yoruba, 
questioned. She previous census had been, held under British
in 1952-53 and the suspicion was fcfrat for motives of their 
own, the British had, inflated the Northern figures, On the ba­
sis of that census the North had been given 173 seats, the East 
74, the West G2 and Lagos 3. The NCNC had come to reala.se, ‘coo, 
that far from being able to manipulate the NPC leaders, it was 
itself, likely always to remain the junior partner in the coali­
tion. Thus southern politicians, NCNC as well as AG, looked to 
the census of late 1962 to redress the balance. In these cir­
cumstances the census operation was fought, like an election and 
produced results which, were inflated in some areas and upon the 
validity of which the NCNC and NFC could not agree.
In Oeceraber, 1S63 a second census was taken and this 
time the results were so inflated in all regions that Nigeria's 
population stood at the astonishing total of 55 .6  million, The 
comparative census totals were as follows? . :
Region 1363 census 1952-3 Census House, of .Representatives— g. - .
North 29,758,875 IS .2 m. 167
Bast. 12#3S4,64S 7.2 n . 70
West 10,265,046 ^ . 57
Mid-West 2,535,337 5,1 m' - 14
Lagos 623,352 35,000 4
Total 55.6 m. 32 m. 312
For all the inflating of numbers this loft the North-south ba­
lance practically as bofore and the disappointment for the, sou­
thern parties imposed a fatal strain on the NCNC-NFC coalition.
Dr Miahael Xhaonukura Okpara, premier of the Eastern Region, 
and 2ik 's  successor as leader of the NCNC, declared there had 
been 'astronomical inflation1 and described the figures as 'worse 
than useless'.  Premier Qsadobay regarded them as a 'stu- .
pendous uoke' ^  and the ag  condemned them strongly. The East­
ern Government went so far as to challenge them in court, bat 
the challenge was dismissed. Ahraadu Bello, Premier of the Norbfc, 
decaided on a strong line and stated that he was ready Cor a com­
plete showdown if  the N-N'C and AG did not accept the figures, A 
deadlock ensued with ths Elections for the Federal Parliament 
due/ but by deciding to fight the elections the southern parties 
accepted by implication the validity of the returns. ■
ct The Gsnftral Blectitir., December, 1964. 
i- New Polarisation of. Parties.
in the WesSt, ihe split in the regional coalition go­
vernment which followed :the census, was intentionally aggravated 
by Chief Xkintola who, v:a.th NPC backing, -took an increasingly 
ant:l-lbo stand. He succeeded in detaching the fourteen Yoruba 
Assembly Members-of the RCNC and with them formed.-a new p. ■ ■ 
the1 Nigerian National Democratic Party, w^.th the main objective 
of furthering the interests of the Yoruba people and. having a 
conservative social policy. As the governing party it issued a 
white japex in which it asousefl the Ibo people of attempting • 
dominate -the country by filling the key positions in Government 
and!state corporations. This change was backed by a similar 
though more moderate statement from tho UPC and in the North 
feeling against the Ibo-residents became so intense that the . 
Premier had to intervene personally to restrain his people from . 
violence against them, j
| The first clear break in the coalition took place ’ 
whetv the NPC supported, the Mid-West Democratic Front against the 
KCNC in the first, enaction in th«- Mid~fts it .early in 1964.
Though.the front lost Sadly i:; sesemed at- one stage; as if its 
anti-ibo propaganda, ani; claim to have th* Federal Government on 
its; side might coat th« NCNC control of the Region. Further, 
the NCNC noticed that to an increasing extent the NPC. was ally­
ing: itself wifchdiflsiden’E elomenta in tlvj south, and NCNC leaders 
were aware of their vulnerability in those parts of the East 
that, still.-hankered after tho setting up of a calabar-ogoua- 
Riv:<$rs (COR) stats. . . .
» After the cansus figures .had been published the NCHC
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realised that if it were not to remain merely an ineffectual 
partner an the coalition it had to make a bid for power at the 
centre and it  had to do so before all opposition in the Ncxth 
had eroded. Owing to the rapprochement ''M.wc-on North and West, 
the East was threatened, with isolati: i..,l it was natural that 
the NCNC turn to the other southern party, the AG. m  May. Dr . 
Okpara toured the Western Region accompanied by the leader of 
the AG,. Adegbenro. The dangerous southern 'Christian1 Alliance 
was beginning to take shape, .in June they agreed to an alliance 
and in July to fight the election jointly. In October the Unit­
ed Progressive Grand alliance (UPGA) was formed, with Dr Okpara 
as the leader and the NCNC a.s the senior partner. The second ; 
party was the AG led by Adegbenro, but whose rallying point re­
mained the imprisoned Awolowo. They were joined by the North- 
era Progressive .Front, made up of Aminu Kano's Northern Elements 
Progressive Union.and J .S . Tarka’s United Middle Beit Congress.
. At the same time another alliance was being forged.
A certain design might, be seen m  th«a actions of the NPC. its 
support for Akin viols &ta& 5*5-; rc>;nuitivn of  the NNDP; its anti- 
Ibo propaganda; -haiapioning o£ the Mid-West Democratic Front 
against, the KCUC\ >c< 3 -its contact with dissident groups in the 
East ailseem  to ravu-'.' .m att<ampt to tot end control ta the 
East. Thusr ?« tha Stet’1 >7i%r »s the -S^ sjt and the NC^C had been 
used to destroy t*e AS, so cov? tho West-.and.the NNDP were to-be 
used to cripple «.\e SiC^ T. aad divide up the- Sa.st; and just as the 
creation of the State had weakened the West, so wou^d
a COR state da/arupt! S^at. on 20th Augaafc the Nicerian Na­
tional Alliance wuss. fyjfinfad t.the w & )  by the NPC and Ahmadu 
Bello, its chief -ft.lly was t;v9 NNDp Akintoia, who had - .
achieve# the all.ianoa for which he had fcwUea* It included the 
Mid-West.Democratic -Front, the Mger D o 'W  Coi.'tf-ess, the Dynamic 
Party, the.- Republican Party and the Lagoa State United Front, 
l i . The Election. ■ - '
The election which vms in reality a straight fight be­
tween North and south degenerated into intimidation and violence 
as the Governments of tsacsh regs.on used their power to make it 
almost impossible lor outside parties to campaie: ia their re­
gions. complaints of thuggery, irregularities ar.u interference 
came from all parts of the country and UpGA dlai.nsd that four ... 
thousand party worJ.ors had been arrested m  the North and, forty.
candidates jailed so as to allow NPC candidates to be returned 
unopposed. The greatest turbulence, however, was to be found 
in the strife-torn Western Region, where both sides hired orga­
nised bands of thugs for the purpose of intimidating individuals 
and breaking up meetings. The Federal Electoral Commission be­
gan to disintegrate? though the majority agreed that irregulari­
ties had been serious m  many places, only two of the six (from 
the East and the Mid-West) actually wanted the election postponed. 
After the close of nominations it was announced that 78 candidat­
es had been elected unopposed, 61 of whom were NPC. UPGA believ­
ed -that only discrimination could have produced this total of 
unopposed NPC candidates, described the election a s a  gigantic 
fraud and called for a boycott of the election if  it  were not 
postponed. The Prime Minister refused and on 20th December poll­
ing began.. Xn the East and in Lagos the boycott was .so effective 
that almost no polling took place? in the West and. Mid-West Re­
gions voting was confused and partial while the North remained 
unaffected. The UNA swept the Worth as expected and, owing to 
UPGAls boycott, was able to triumph in the West, emerging with- 
an overwhelming majority of 198 out of 312 seats. 'Thus the NCNC 
had failed to shake tbs UPC bold in the North or even to create 
a solid UPGR bloc in the south by securing an AG victory in the 
West. 1st to 4th January saw the apogee of the crisis. Zik, the 
President, whose sympathies lay with the. NCNC, did not have the 
constitutional power to order another election and the NCNC could 
do nothing to reverse the situation but secede. T.t seems thac 
Sir Abubakar called the secession bluff and that the NCNC, 
brought to the brink of, shattering the .Federation, drew back.
At first zik refused to call on Sir Abubakar to form a now govern­
ment, but on 4th January he gave way on the understanding that 
a broad-based national government be formed. When the Cabinet 
was formed, 4 of the 17 Ministers w w e  members of the NCNC. in 
those areas in which elections had not been held, new elections 
took place and UPGA obtained 52 seats to jive it a total of 108. 
The unea:-y alliance of North and East was thus restored, in the 
Government at any rate, but the wounds of the elcation had struck 
deep.
d. The Regional Election m  the West, October, 19,65.
Strife in the West nad not been settled and the events
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followed m  October, 1965.- This was the first regional election 
since the state of emergency which had returned Akintola to 
power. It had for a long time been evident that in spite of its 
control of the administrative machinery the NNDP could not win 
any genuinely free election against the AG. After UPGA's de­
feat in the general election its only hope lay in the belief 
that Akintola, however much he rigged the election, could not 
win. Such a victory would defeat the NPC's ambitions in the 
south, give UPGA control of all three southern, regions and -.able 
it to challenge the North in the Senate* Akintola was equally 
determined to win. He had ruled with a heavy hr 3 and he had no 
wish to suffer the consequences of being forced out of power by 
his opponents. Also, if  UPGA won and were able to secure a ma­
jority m  the Senate, the NPC would either have to come to terms 
with, it and jettison the NNDP or alternatively hasten a North- .
- south showdown. it  was therefore crucial that the NNDP be con­
firmed in office. . . - .
Akintola proved an unequalled master of election tech­
niques and 'never in the short history of parliamentary elections 
in Nigeria was there such massive rigging as occurred in Western 
Nigeria in October*. Such were the lengths to which his ad­
ministration, went to remain in office that during a Parliament­
ary debate in which • xamples of irregularities were cited, ^
. one speaker rose to conclude: 1 any surprise then that Mr. Ian
1. Arikrpo, Okoi, op. c it ., p. 140.
2 . it is interesting to quote a few examples, taken mainly from
. Parliamentary debates, but confirmed by journals, newspa­
pers and books? of such irregularities.
"As everyone knows, m  many places the results were 
transposed - . . .  in Ondo North Constituency where Chief 
Adekeye won 13,099 votes to defeat his opponent who scored, 
only 1,870 votes was declared as the successful candidate... 
. one Mr Olusa who said that he has crossed carpet at Owo 
won as an U.P.G.A. candidate. After he had won it was an­
nounced there that he won, but after some time the W.N.B.S. 
and later Rosiji's N.B.C. . . .  announced that Mr Olusa had 
lost the election. So, Olusa who was in a fix declared for 
the N .N .D .P ., and immediately after that time another news 
item flashed out again that 03usa had won the election...
. . . .  It was this same way that an Electoral Officer, on
the daybefore election, was caught with 44 certificates of 
those who had already won before the election took place! .
There was an incident at Mushm here. People were talk­
ing about Ballot Boxes, and so one small girl told the 
people that if they were looking for Ballot Boxes, they
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Smith, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, spoke in the way he 
did about Nigeria'.^ Mr E.E, Esua, Chairman of the Western 
Nigeria Electoral Commission, complained that his Commission had 
been impotent and admitted to many irregularities concerning . 
police thuggery and unopposed candidates, although Akintola won 
and, with the continued support of the Federal Government, de­
clared himself elected, he was never able to establish his authb- 
rity and the Region rapidly deteriorated into, chaos. Not only 
frustrated politicians, but a disgusted public could see no ad­
vantage in legal activities end took the law into their own hands. 
When challenged in Parliament sir Abubakar replied;
"As far as X am aware, the elections in the West . 
were held, and the authority which is competent to 
announce the winners of the elections - the Western 
. Nigerian Electoral Commission - had told us that, the 
N.N.D.P. had won the elections. As far as Z am 
aware,- too, the Governor of Western Nigeria had call- .
ed upon the leader of the N.N.D.P. to form the Go­
. vernment." (2)
By Christmas week disturbances and lawlessness in the West were 
widespread and still increasing, and the Nigerian police admit­
ted -that the task of maintaining' law and order was beyond them.
Yet the Federal Government refused to declare a state of emer­
gency on the grounds that it was a regional matter. This might 
be compared with their immediate declaration of a state of emer­
gency in 1962 'when the situation was far less critical. Nigeria 
was at the brinK, and something had to happen,
e. The Military Takes Over, January, 1966.
Mr R.B»K. Okafor; 'in view of the sorrowful inci­
dent which, has taken place within the last few hours, I beg to 
move that this House do now adjourn. ' ^  And so at 9.20 am. on
were in her mother's house." - Mr W.O. Briggs, HRD, Vol. 
19, October, 19G5, pp. 140 and 141. ■
Chief O.B. Akin-Olugbade gave some further examples: ' 
"There were fifteen candidates fraudulently returned 
unopposed ><•"? UPGA candidates ware refused entry to poll- 
ling and counting stations;- "Dumping of ballot papers in 
N.N.D.P. boxes"; and "Millions of ballot papers found with 
N.N.D.P. agents". Ibid., p. 149.
' A correspondent of West Africa wrote: "I have been able
• to verify to my own satisfaction that a 'pregnant' woman 
was discovered on examination to have ballot papers inside 
her robes." West Africa, 1G.10.65, p. 1151.
1. Chief V.O. Onabango, KRD, Vol. 19, October, 1955, p. 143.
2. Ibid., p. 199.
3. Ibid., vol. 20, 12-15 January, 1965, p. 54.
42
Saturday, 15th, January the House adjourned, many members not even 
being aware o£ the nature of the sorrowful incident. It was, in 
fact, that Nigeria's first Republic had come to an end. In the . 
explosive situation that resulted from the October elections with 
the people’s refusal to accept Akintola, the Western Government's 
inability to control the chaos and the Federal Government's un­
willingness to exercise its responsibility for order, certain Ibo 
officers decided to act. Appalled at the prospect that they 
might be called in to maintain Akintola in power and at the real 
possibility of the Sardauna of Sokoto imposing his own military 
solution, they moved first.
in the early hours of 15th January the officers depos­
ed vith swift efficiency political leaders in the federal and 
regional capitals. In Kaduna a small detachment under Major 
Chukuma Nzeogwu shot Ahmadu Bello and. took control. in the south 
Sir Abubakar and his Minister of Finance, Chief Okotie-Eboh, were 
shot and Chief Akintola met the same fate. By dawn the broad­
casting and telecommunications centres in Lagos, the Federal Par­
liament and other key buildings had been surrounded, and road­
blocks established along the airport road. On ISth January it 
■as reported that after a further discussion by the Federal Ca- 
inet the administration of the country had been transferred, as 
a temporary measure to the army under Major-General John Aguiyi- 
Ironsi. At 11,50 pm. the Acting President, Dr Nwafor Orizvu 
broadcast to the nation that he had been advised by the Council 
of Ministers to hand Over the country to the armed forces; Major 
Nzeogwu and his 'Supreme Council of the Revolution1 surrendered 
and gave to Ironsi a 'declaration of loyalty1.
. "Whatever part they themselves are now to play,
the mutiny of Nigeria‘s 'middle rank' officers has 
led to a military regime. And that is what they 
wanted. That, too, is what a great number of civi- .
lian Nigerians want, and politicians of all persua- 
. sions in Nigeria seem to have been quick to realise 
that this is no time to.eompete with the soldiers.
Even the leaders of the two Regional governments, 
which were unaffected by the mutiny have gracefully ‘ 
stood aside to let General Aguiyi-xronsi's military, 
governors take over. And throughout the country a . 
most remarkable calm has reigned..." (1)
A Supreme Military council was established to administer the new
1, West Africa, 22.1.66, p. SI.
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Federal Military Government. Military Governors were appointed 
to. head the Regions and were to be assisted by the ex-regional 
Governors.
Two factors, however, were to lead to a frustration 
of hopes for peace, in the first place, ironsi lacked, the ca­
pacity to solve Nigeria's problems. Instead of providing leader­
ship he surrounded himself with a small circle of Ibo friends- 
what was to have been the first truly Nigerian Government dege­
nerated into, rule by an Ibo clique, out of touch with opinion m  
the non-ibo parts of the country. It was the inexpert advice 
ironsi was to receive from them that led to the unification 
decree and the first riots. •
1 * .. there .was [secondly] the vexed position 
of the fate of the plotters of the January 15 m ­
. cident. Soma Nigerians thought of them as heroes 
in leading the overthrow of the much hated poli­
ticians but their killings of innocent army offi­
cers mainly from Regions* other than their own, in­
flicted a major wound on the Nigerian army famous 
for its discipline. It is unfortunate that a de- .
cision one \/ay or the other war. not promptly taken 
in this regard. When it was learnt in some quar­
ters of the army that those directly involved, al­
. though.detained m  various prison establishments 
in the country were being paid their regular sa­
laries plus other allowances, the hitherto smother­
ed feeling that those concerned should have been 
brought to book according to military tradition ap- 
t-irently began to show expression in the impatience 
M  a section of the army. The already charged si- •
^ution reached an explosive point when a very 
strong rumour started circulating that there was a - 
further plot to annihilate army officers and civi­
lians from the same Region as most of those who 
had been killed in January. This wag the immediate 
cause of the events of July 29." (l)
The advice which ironsi received was to take the bull 
of tribalism by the horns, abolish the federal system and de­
clare Nigeria a unitary siiute. This ho Aid on 24th May by means 
of the constitution (suspension and Modification) Decree, No. 34 
of 1966* The former Regions wore abolished and replaced by groups 
of provinces. Nigeria ceased to be described as a Federation 
and became known as the Republic of Nigeria. The former Fede­
ral Military Government and the Central Council became respec­
tively the National Military Government and the Executive Ccun-
Government Statement on the Current Nigerian Situation fg-
Division, Sgos?
cil. Tlie top grades of all five civil services were centralis­
ed. The Federal Territory of Lagos became the Capital Territory 
of Lagos. Some 107 political parties and tribal associations 
were banned.
"The provisions of the decree [ironsi .dec- 
laredj are intended to remove the last vestiges 
of the intense regionalism of the .recent past and 
to produce that cohesion in the governmental 
structure which is so necessary in achieving and 
maintaining the paramount objective of the Nation­
al Military Government and, indeed, of every true 
. Nigerian, namely, national unity." . (1)
It seemed clear to the people of the North that under the uni­
tary system the more advanced Ibo would assume control of. every­
thing. The Unification Decree was interpreted there as final 
proof that ironsi's Government represented an Ibo conspiracy, to 
rule the North, and the country. Five days later tribal nots 
began in. seven towns in the North on an unprecedented scale, os­
tensibly against the Decree, apd resulting in destry-tion of the 
property and lives of many people of Eastern Nigerian origin - 
between GOO and 1,000 died between May and, June.
£. The Northern Officers1 Counter Coup, July, 1966.
A basic inadequacy in Ironsi‘ s calculations was h->s 
failure to appreciate that tribal hostility had corrod— • 
the army and become so intense. The one instrument he 
of as being truly national above all others failed him. fte — s 
in Ibadan to plfcad for support for his scheme when in the early 
hours of 29th July a spontaneous army mutiny oroke out at Abeo- 
kuta Barracks. It spread to the barracks at Ikeja and before 
.dawn to Ibadan.. Fifty soldiers entered the State Souse there 
and kidnapped Ironei and his host, Lieutenant-colonel.Fajuyi, 
the Military Governor of the Western Provinces, ister they were 
both reported killed. In the barracks Northern soldiers, some 
over-suspicious and others revengeful, began to kill Ibo offi­
cers and soldiers, and these panic killings spread. Before mid­
night on 29th-30th July, however, fighting stopped and Brigadier 
OgundipQ/ Chief of Sta.f£ of the Supreme Command and second-in­
command to ironsi, began negotiations with the rebels, allegedly 
turning on their demands for outright secession by the North
1. Africa Research Bulletin ~ Political, No. 5, May, 19SS, 
p. 534b., {'Political1 denotes 'Political, Social and 
Cultural',)
and West or at least a return to the status quo ante 15th Ja­
nuary- Ogundipe declined to succeed ironsi and Lieutenant- 
Colonel Yakubu Gowon was asked to do so'. Gowon, a popular . 
young Northern officer, agreed.to assume command provided the 
North did not break away and that all regions revert to the fe­
deral system. In his first broadcast Gowon announced that the 
events of the previous seven months had convinced him that 'the 
basis for trust and confidence in our unitary system of govern­
ment has not been able to stand the test o.£ time1, ^  and that 
there should be-a return to the position prior to Decree 34. 
Within a month ha issued a decree by which Nigeria reverted to 
the federal system, abolishing Ironsi's Unification innovations.
Among many.of the Northerners, the moderation of the. 
Head of State, a Northerner but a .Christian and of a minor 
tribe, seemed irksome; and mutinous troops resumed; the anti-Ibo.
. pogroms. The death roll among the Xbo soared as did the number 
fleeing home, as a counter measure to the massacres xn the 
North the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, Lieutenant-Colo- 
nel chukwuemeka Oduroegvu Qjukwu, on 4th October ordered all non- 
Eastemers living in. the East to be repatriated to thear home 
areas under armed escort. When the madness subsided and the 
counting was done it was estimated that up to 30,000 Ibo-speak- 
ing people had been murdered and that two million had fled home­
, wards as refugees. .
g. Mie East Secedes. , ■
"... scarcely a single Eastern family has not . 
suffered directly or indirectly from the massacre, 
mutilation or robbery of Easterners in the North, 
or their flight home. The events of May, it is con­
ceded in the East, could liave bean a delayed reac- . 
tion to the murder of Sir Abubakar and the Sardauna.
The murder of Easterners in the army last -July, it 
is even conceded, was a delayed reply to the murder 
of senior^ non-Eastern officers in January. But the 
.appalling slaughter of September-October is various­
ly attributed In the East to the desire of ‘old po­
liticians' to destroy the constitutional talks in 
Lagos, to the determination of unnamed Northerners 
to eradicate Eastern commercial influence in the •
North, or to a Northern desire to wipe out the East 
as the only forae standing in the way of Northern 
. domination." . (2)
1. Arikpo, Okoi, op. cit., p. 9.
2. M&tchet's Diary, West Africa, 3.5.4.67, p. 485.
It was not only the murders, the robberies and the 
refugees that impelled Easterners to move away from their former 
homes but also the fact that the Federal Military Government had 
been either unwilling or unable to prevent the atrocities. In 
October, after the massacres, the East refused to attend the 
Constitutional Conference until its demand was met that all sol­
diers of Northern origin based in Lagos, ikeja and Ibadan be re­
moved. The condition was not met and.no conference was attended 
by Eastern representatives until the Chairman of the National 
Liberation Council of Ghana, Lieutenant-General Ankrah, offered 
his services to bring the two parties together, With his en­
couragement and co-operation the Supreme Military Council met at 
Aburi in Ghana on 4th and 5th January, 1967, In the communique, 
agreement, was reported on all ihems, hut it soon appeared that 
there was no agreement on their interpretation, General Gowon's 
view was that the military leaders had agreed to return to the 
constitutional position before l?tfc January, 1966 and that any 
powers which had been removed from the Regions after 17th Janua­
ry should be restored to them. Agreement. had been reached for 
the Supreme Military Council to deal ‘with all matters of na- . 
tional importance affecting the whole country1, but it was ‘never 
the intention' that the Regional Governors should have the power 
to veto decisions of that Council. ^  ojukwu, on the other hand, 
said.that it was 'unanimously agreed that it was in the interests 
of the safety of this nation that the regions should move slight­
ly further apart than before' .^The decisions at Aburi, there­
fore, went beyond Gowon's interpretation; federal/executive and 
legislative power, in Qjukwu's view, was to be vested.in the Su­
preme Military council rather than in the Supreme commander, and 
any decision affecting the whole country referred to the Council 
to obtain the concurrence of all the Military Governors before 
becoming law. she difference was fundamental, a return to the 
pre-January position would leave the Federation intaat; that was 
what Gowon wanted and that was how he interpreted Aburi. The in­
troduction of a collegiate executive where each Governor had a 
veto would greatly weaken the Federation: that vas what Ojukwu 
wanted and that was his interpretation of Aburi. In March they
1. West Africa, 11.3.67, p. 329.
2. Africa Research Bulletin - Political, No. 1, 1967, p. 698c.
restated their positions, and Ojulcwu gave Gowon. until 31st March 
to implement the Aburi agreement; otherwise he would carry i,t 
out unilaterally.
True to his word, Ojqkwu on 31st March decreed that all 
revenues collected in the Region on behalf of the Federal Govern- pj 
ment should be paid to the Bast Nigerian Government (Revenue Col­
lection Edict, 1967). It .did not affect oil royalties , which 
were paid through the Bank of England. On 4th April air services 
between the Bast and the rest of the Federation were discontinued 
by the Bast and later a Nigeria Airways aircraft was seized. On 
18th April Cjukwu took the final step before secession. He issu*. 
ed the Statutory Bodies Edict, 1967, which set up a Statutory 
Bodies Council and transferred ten Government agencies to it; the 
Electricity Corporation of Nigeria, Nigeria Airways, the Nigerian || 
Broadoasfciug Corporation, the Nigerian Coal corporation, the Ni- * 
gerian National Shipping Lines, the Nigerian ?ores Authority, -the- jf 
Nigerian Produce Marketing Company, the Nigerian Railways Corpo- 1] 
ration, the Pepartment of Posts and Telegraphs and the Citizen­
ship and Leadership Training centre..
In a broadcast to the nation on 27th May Colonel Gowon 
said that the continued defiance of federal authority by the 
Eastern Region had produced uncertainty and insecurity generally 
and had ’pushed the country with increasing tempo toward total 
disintegration and possible civil war.1.^  Gowon had long been 
of the view that the Federation could only survive if the old 
Regions were further subdivided to eliminate the overwhelming 
position of the North? this was his answer to those who claimed 
that the July coup had simply restored the North to dominance.
He thus issued a decree establishing twelve new states in expec­
tation of the Bast's sece\ ion; an announcement intended to con­
vey to the non-lbo people of the East that at last they were to 
be granted the autonomy thsy had so long demanded. They were to 
compare this status with their future under Ojulcwu's breakaway 
country and were thus given an added incentive to join the fede­
ral effort in the coming struggle.' By splitting the Bast in 
three - one state for the xbo and two for the minority groups - 
Gowon took from tho xbos their outlet to the sea* Port Harcourt,
t
i
1. Ibid., No. 5, 1967, p. 778c.
and the oil-rich areas of the East. This would leave Iboland 
landlocked, poor and overcrowded?and secession followed‘imme- 
diately. On the same day a joint meeting o£ the Advisory Cofflr 
mittee of chiefs and Bidets and the Consultative Assembly at 
Enugu authorised lieutenant-Colonel O^ukwu to declare xndepen- 
dence. On 30th May he announced that Eastern Nigeria would 
henceforth be known as the Republic of Biafra and that all po­
litical ties between it and the Federation were totally dissolv­
ed. Gowon immediately responded that the ’ill advised statement' 
by Opukwu was an act of rebellion which would be crushed. Pull 
economic sanctions were introduced and a war of polemics and . 
propaganda followed. But civil war was inevitable. Saving tot­
tered so long on the brink Nigeria had finally gone over. - 3Qth 
June was aptly described by Qjukwu as the zero Hour. . The suf­
fering, - the bitter fighting- and the wholesale manslaughter and . 
starvation that were to follow could never have been imagined . 
by those who made the decisions.
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CHAPTER II : FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE FORMATION
OP NIGERIA'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
' UNDER CIVILIAN GOvERNMBHT .
"The foreign .policy of a country depends on 
a whole series of factors acting simultaneously 
and not always in the same direction, it is the 
. aunt of these factors, however, which determines 
and guides foreign policy. We must observe these -
• factora, analyse them and estimate their, strength, 
i.e. the amount of influence which they exert. We 
must also study them in a dynamic perspective - 
not just at a gxven moment bub in their historical 
development.,r (1)
Before the military coup of January, 1966, Nigeria : 
was one of the few countries on the continent of Africa whose 
foreign policy was affected by pressures and lectors comparable 
with those of the developed countries of the West - there was a . 
large body of able leaders offering alternate policies, there 
were three major and a few minor political parties with varied 
views on foreign affairs, there was a free press, and there 
were student and youth movements, trade unions, and so on*
. . Keom. the time when Nigerians were informed of the date 
of independence, and the leaders realised that a foreign policy 
would have to be formulated, until democracy suffered its first 
serious setback with the crisis in the Western Region (a period, 
of about three years), all these pressures and factors prevail­
ed^ Once opposition leaders were imprisoned and the major oppo­
sition party crippled, sortie of these pressures disappeared. As 
the position in the country continued to become increasingly . 
critical so a- decreasing amount of time was devoted bo foreign 
affairs, which in terms of the needs of the troubled country had 
become something of a luxury. Foreign policy debates in Parlia­
ment ceased almost completely and Parliament itself met less. and. 
less frequently and sat for shorter periods, •
A. The Men Who Made the Decisions.
"concrete foreign policy deoisions, of course, .
. are made, not by a society at large, but. by certain 
designated smaller groups within it ... Generally
- the ambiguity in hypothesizing about relations be-
1. Thiam, Doudou, The Foreign Policy of African.States, London, 
1965, Introduction, p. xi. • .• .
tween social values and foreign policy could pro­
bably be better avoided if attention was focussed 
. on the values of such select groups ... The elite 
groups often constitute a tiny minority that dif­
fers from the majority in education, occupation, 
wealth, successful upward mobility, experience 
with urbanism and other aspects of the modern 
world, and other crucial characteristics." (1 )
While quite clearly the men who carry the most weight 
in decision-making cannot be separated .from their backgrounds
- or for that matter from their regions and parties - neverthe­
less- their personalities and characters play a central role in 
the formulation of foreign policy? and their development and 
experiences are among the Chief factors accounting for its pat­
tern. This is very true of Africa# and this , is very true of Ni­
geria.
The Sardauna of. Sokoto, Alhaii Sir Ahmadu Bello, Premier of . .. 
Northern Nigeria, 1953 - 1966-. , • .< . • •. • • •- . . •
The Sardauna was born in 1910 in Sabah in the Sokoto 
district of. the North. The first. Sultan of Sokoto, Muhaman . 
Bello,, son of Dan Fodio, was ATunadu' gireat-grandfat’her. He., 
was also well connected on his maternal side, his grandn'other 
being the daughter of the fourth Fulani Emir of Ka^ io-, and he 
asserted a. claim to descent on both sides from the Holy Prophet.
He grew up in Sokoto and until tha age of sixteen 
attended the Regional School there. He then, went to the Katsina 
Teachers* Training College from which he returned to teach in 
Sokoto. until appointed a government official. In 1938 he became 
the. Sardauna of Sokoto, ^  and in 1944 was appointed General 
Secretary of the Sokoto Native Authority. He travelled, to Eng­
land in 1948 where he studied forestry, agriculture and British 
government. In 1943 lie was appointed to the Northern House of 
Assembly and, when the NPC became a political party, emerged as 
its leader. In 1953 he became Premier of the North. Until self­
government he, and his deputy, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, were able 
to operate independently of direct mass support and without'pop­
ular accountability. *:■ fact they were modern politicians in 
the quite limited seny.j fcnnt they were parliamentarians. •
1. Lystadt, .Robert A.,. Cultural and Psychological Factors, in
African. Diplomacy, ed. Mackay, Vernon, London, 1966, 
Chapter VI, p. 92. '.
2. in the feudal period the Sardauna was Commander-in-Chaef of
the noble warrior class or the royal army.
51
"... Here.is a man of the most formal piety, 
conversant with the Koran and Fulani traditions, 
yet a devotee of cricket and fives; an African Mos- .
lero Chief whs strangely assumes, in his sudden swit- . 
ches of identity, an English public school menta- '
lity." (1) '
The Sardauna's roots and experience disposed him to 
concern himself particularly with religion, obedience, order, 
stability and discipline, his rule being founded on the pre­
cepts of . Islam-. 'There is no power in me save through Allah.- 
In Him do I trust and to Him do X turn’.^
He was not only the heau of the largent party in Nige­
ria and the Premier of the largest .Region, but also the out- . 
standing contender for appointment as Sultan of SoTcoto, the most 
prestigious position of the old. Fulani Empire. As the most 
powerful man in Nigeria, he became a symbol of conservatism. 
Since to him the North was of greater importance -than the Fede­
ration as a -whole, he chose bo remain Premier of his Region and 
allow his Deputy, Six Ababakar, to become Prime Minister of the 
Federal Government, believing that he would retain considerable 
influence over him. He felt his own position to be in no way. 
inferior to that of the Prims Minister, ^  and was later to em- 
barass him by statements on foreign policy, particularly m  con­
nection with pan-Islam andthe Middle East. •
Alhajj. sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Prime Minister. 1957 - 1966.
When Sir Abubakai* was assassinated in the military, 
coup of January, 1966 Kwame ukrumah, in a special broadcast, . 
commented that Sir Abubakar had 'died a vic-cim of forces he did 
not. understand and a martyr to a neo-aolonialist system of which 
he w?ss merely the figurehead. Deeply religions, honest and sin­
cere in his personal dealings, striving valiantly to master a 
situation which was beyond his capacity, he has fallen in a 
struggle whose nature he never understood' . ^  -
. Diamond, Stanley, Nigeria - Model of a colonial Failure,
New York, 1967, American Committee on Africa (Occasional 
. Paper: 6), p. 26. .
Holy Koran, Chapter XI, Verse 88, in Bello, Ahmadu, op; . 
cit, preface p. ix. on the same page he states: “I 
have always based my actions on my inward convictions, on 
my conscience, and-on the dictates-of my religion”.
"... they do not understand that the premier of any Region- 
is.not m  any way subordinate to the Prime Minister: our 
paths are, in fact, quite separate and our functions do 
not overlap ..." Bello, Ahmadu, op. cit., p. 208. .
West Africa, 29.1.66, p. 133. -
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Balewa's status in traditional terras was as humble 
as the sardauna's was exalted. Born m  the Bauchi Emirate in 
191?, son of a commoner whose title; Garkuwan Sharaaki {literal­
ly bodyguard or keeper of the horses), was at that time confer­
red strictly on members of slave lineages. He attended the 
village school, the Bauchi Provincial School and then Katsina 
Teachers’ Training College from which he graduated in 1933. in
1945 he was awarded a scholarship to London University‘s insti­
tute of Education- . . .
. In 1S46 he became the first traditionally non-eligible 
person to be appointed to the Emir of Bauchi's Council, in 1-947 
he was elected for Bauchi to the Northern House of Assembly and 
to the Legislative Council of the country as a whole, and in 
1951 was re-elected to these bodies, the latter renamed the 
House of Representatives. In 1952 he was -appointed Minister of . 
■Works and In 1954 Minister of Transport, and in this capacity 
visited, the.United States and Holland to study water transport. . 
He received the OBB in 1952 and the CBE in 1955, and was knight­
ed at independence, having' become Prime Minister on 30th August, 
1957. ' ■ • ' • - • • -
"The central feature of Balewa’s experience 
. then is upward social mobility , < A,singularly -
low-born member of an emphatically ascriptive so­
ciety that change has incorporates rather than 
displaced; Balewa’.s socio-political point of van- . 
tag© is truly that of the '.new roan'." (1) .
.. He understood the necessity of balancing his progressive 
ideals with his respect for the conservative traditionalism or 
the North, and in striving for a harmonious reconciliation of 
the two, acquired an ability for compromise and a belief n prag­
matism. These made him the one man who might have kept Nigeria 
together had he had sufficient time to consolidate his control. 
There was ’something old-fashioned, patriarchal, about him' and
in the realm of ideas he was cautious and compared to a nineteenth 
. 1 “ 
century liberal. He had no inclination for fire and venom .
and never became a charismatic figure around whom all Nigerians
would rally. .
1. Whittaker, C.S. Jr., Three perspectives on Hierarchy, • .Poli­
tical Thought and Ledarship in Northern Nigeria, Journal 
of. Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. Ill, 1965, p. 6.
2. Italiaander, Rolf, The New Leaders of Africa, London, 1961,
pp. 195 - 196.
•- Whatever the pressures of the Sardauna ana the North,
his own personality and judgement were to have a profound effect 
upon the tone of Nigeria1s foreign policy. His restraint, mode­
ration and knack for compromise typified Nigeria’s international 
policies as did his imdogmstac, non-donuneeiringr and non-nlilifca- 
rist approach; and while his lack of dynamism might have lost 
Nigeria some support, his own personal integrity won. Nigeria 
much respect. Two further aspects of his management of foreign • 
affairs merit notice. These were his skilful:, avoidance of a - 
policy that would drive Nigeria’s tribes' further apart, exemp- • 
lified by his opposition to the alteration of boundaries i:a Af­
rica; and secondly, the manner in which he prevented an intensi­
fication of religious differences: his handling of the Israeli 
loan was a case in. point.
Dr Nnamdi Aaikiwe; Premier of the East, 1954 - 1959, Governor- 
General, I960 - 1963; President, 1963 -1966, • -
Saikxwe, aorrartonly known as Zik, was the one man who 
might have been to Nigeria what Nkrumah was fco Ghana or Sekou 
Toure was to Guinea. Heie was the charismatic figure who for 
twenty-five years had been in the forefront of pan~Afric.an . 
thought,, the nationalist firebrand, the ‘man of triumphal tours, 
big gestures, the crowds and the limelight'.^  '
He was born in 1904 into a Methodist, Ibo family and 
received a Westem-Christian education at the C.M.S. Central 
School in Onitsha, the Hope waddel Training college in Calabar 
and the Methodist Boys' High School in Lagos. He spent nine 
y^ears in the United States working his way through Storer Col­
lege, West Virginia, and Howard, Lincoln, Columbia and Pennsyl­
vania Universities,- obtaining an MA in philosophy end an MSc in 
anthropology. During his last four years he lectured m  history 
and political science at Lincoln and later received honorary doc­
torates from botli Lincoln and Howard. He also completed a cour­
se in journalism. In 1934 he visited London for the publication 
of his first book, 'Liberia in Wot Id Polities'. He then went to 
the Gold Coast to edit the Afriaan Morning Post and in 1937 re­
turned to Nigeria. His reputation for invective, political 
skill, oratory and organisation preceded him and shortly after
1. Williams, David, The Times, London, Special supplement on 
Nigeria, 29.9.60, p. iv.
arriving in Lagos he became a member of the Nigerian Youth Move­
ment Executive and founded the West African Pilot. He was the 
moving spirit behind the formation of the NCNC in 1944 and in .
1946 was elected President.of the party.
- He became a member of the Legislative Council in Lagos, 
held important posts in the Eastern and Western Houses of Assem­
bly, and was named Premier or the Bast an 1954. He was excluded 
from becoming Prime Minister by the size of the North and the 
political victory of the NPC. He took his party into a coalition 
with the NFC and m  so doing, had to compromise some of his 
ideals. After the 1959 election he opted out of active politics 
to become, firstly, President of the Senate, then Governor-Gene­
ral and finally President of Nigeria. . .
- His influence, nevertheless, was great, particularly
on. youn< • southern intellectuals, and much of the radical pressure 
that built up.in the sooth found its source in M s  writings ajid . 
in the policies he instilled into the NCNC, sll of which had the 
effeot of attracting the foreign policy of the coalition govern­
ment towards pan-Africanist and neutralist positions.
Chi.ef Obafemi Awolowo, Premier of the West, .1954 - 1959; Leader 
of the Opposition, 1960 - 1963. .
. Awolowo, frequently referred to as Awo, was born in a 
village in Western Nigeria, attended his village school, a Wes­
leyan secondary school and the Methodist School at Abeokuta. He 
worked, as a school teacher, a moneylender■, a transport operator, 
a. produce dealer and a journalist, and in 1944 received a Bache­
lor of Commerce degree through correspondence with London Uni­
versity.. ne then attended that University, obtaining a Bachelor 
of Laws degree, and founded the Yoruba cultural organisation, 
the Egtoe omo oduduwa, later organised into the Action Group, 
which.he led to victory in the West in 1951, He became Minister 
of local Government and in 1954 Premier of his Region. After 
the Federal Elections of 1959 he became Leader of the opposition 
m  the Federal House of Representatives. In 19S3 he was found 
guilty of treasonable felony and sentenced to ten years impri­
sonment- In August, 1966 General Gowon released him and once 
again he was to spring into prominence.
. Before independence he was described as one of the
‘more moderate nationalists m  Nigeria1 who disapproved of the 
policies of both Zik and Nterumah and as 'a man of compromise ... -
who resembles the prime minister in this respect’. ^  His view * 
on neutrality was that it-represented 'an unmitigated disservice , 
to humanity' and he found pan-Africanism to toe unrealistic in both 
its political and economic connotations.
After independence, however, this caution and pro-Wes­
tern approach were to undergo a complete somersault and Awolowo 
was to malce vigorous calls for neutralism and pan-Africanism, 
using the Defence Pact as the vehicle for this dramatic change.^
Dr-Michael Iheonukara Okaara» Premier of the East, 1960 - 1966.
Ha was bom in an Xbo village in 1920 and was educated 
entirely in Nigeria, spending seven years at Yaba, then Nigeria's 
centre of medical education? and practised at Umuahia. He was " 
present at the formation of the NCNG but it was only after the 
shootings.at Enugu in 1949 that he entered politics. He was at 
one .stage arrested.and put undefc surveillance... In 1953 he. ;was . . 
elected to the Eastern House of Assembly and was appointed Minis- t 
ter without Portfolio. In the NCNC split he supported Zik, and 
on the latter!s return.to power, Okpara was made Minister of . • 
Health. . m.. 1957 he became Minister of Production and in. 1959 .
Minister of Agriculture; aiu! when Zik left active politics he I
succeeded, to the Premiership of the Bast and the Presidency of 
the .NCNC, which positions he held until 1966, He. is at present U 
one of Colonel Ojukwu's chief civilian adviser*. 1
He haB been described as .‘an ardent devotee of the 
philosophy which he has called Pragmatic African Socialism’ ^  
and a convinced pan-Africanist, believing that Nigeria's strug­
gle for unification taught 'that the voyage to African Union e 
should be made.at the pace of the slowest boat'.*4) As a first• 
step, he advocated the division of Africa into regional group­
ings, each to promote cultural and economic ties between its mem­
ber states, and, on the basis of sufficient understanding, to form % 
political federations, foundations for an African federation, «' 
confederation or common market. . f.
Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola, Premier of the West, i960 - 1966. £
. Son of a prominent Yoruba trader, he was born in 1910 m
1. Italiaander, Rolf, op. cit., p. 204. ’ -
2. This change of policy is discussed below under the sub-sec­
tion on political Parties.
3. Nigeria Trade journal, No. 3, 1965, p. 110.
4. News from Nigeria, No. 33, 17.6.64, p. 10.
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in.Ogbomosho. At the age of four he was taken to the North, 
where h'e learnt Hausa, attending the Sudan Interior Mission 
School at Mina. At twelve he retuniaci to Ogbonk^o, went to 
a Baptist day school and the Baptist Teachers' Training college, 
after which he taught at the Baptist Academy in Lagos. When 
three fellow teachers were dismissed for agitating he, in his 
capacity as Secretary of the Baptist Workers' Union, resigned 
and went to work .as a railway clerk. He became active in the 
Nigerian Youth Movement and in 1943 was appointed editor of its 
newspaper, the Daily Service. In 1946 he won a British council- 
Bursary to Oxford to study public administration and later read 
law.
in 1950 he returned to Lagos where he served as the 
AG legal adviser and one of Awo's chief lieutenants. In 1951 
he was elected to the Western House of Assembly and the Central 
House* being appointed Minister of Labour, and m  1953 Minster 
of Health. From 1354 to 195? he led the opposition in the House 
of Representatives; from 1957 to 1959 he served as Minister of 
communications under Sir Abubakar; and in 1954 he was elected 
Premier of the West, a position Which he held until his assas­
sination in. the coup of January, 1966.^
■ . Akintola opposed the idea of a United States of Africa,
believing it was unrealistic to expect the abdication of indi­
vidual sovereignty; and that once anti-imperialism ceased to be 
a rallying call there might well be difficulty in finding other . 
common causes which would serve to bring Africa together. He 
recommended a gradual increase of economic co-operation, princi­
pally on a regional basis, and an African, organisation modelled 
on the British commonwealth.. He was of the opinion that racial 
discrimination in South Africa might lead to serious conflict 
but warned that the African states must proceed with caution in 
attempting to combat it. He suggested that Nigeria despatch an 
ambassador to South Africa to learn the facts of the situation, . 
thus enabling Nigeria to take action based on full knowledge of 
that country.
1. His split with Awolowo, his leadership of the united Peoples' 
Party, his coalition with the North and his rigging of . 
elections have been discussed in chapter I.
chief Dennis Chukude Osadebav, President of the Senate, 1960 - 
1963: Premier of the Mid-West, 1964 - 1966- '
Osadebay, an Ibo, was born in 1912. His interest in 
politics led him to co-operate with Zik and Herbert Macaulay in 
forming the NCNC in 1944, anu he rose to a position in the Cen­
tral committee. He attended London University where he read 
law and graduated in 1949. When Zik took office as Governor- 
General, he succeeded him as President of the Senate, and when - 
the people of the Mid-West and the Federal Parliament voted in 
favour of the establishment of a fourth region, he was trans­
ferred there as temporary administrator and then, having led the 
NCNC bo victory, beaame the first Premier of the Mid-West.
He differed -from most other politicians in his belief 
that under- Nigerian conditions the British party system was ar­
tificial. His view was that so. long as freedom of-speech was. 
preserved a one-party, system could not only be more intelligible 
to the people and make better -use of available talent, but could 
also 'give more scope for genuine opposition and criticism and 
less for.personal ambitions'.^  . .
Chief Fesfrus Samuel Okotis-Eboh, Minister of Finance, 1957 - 1966 
Of noble and wealthy stock, Okotie-Eboh was born in 
1912. He attended Sapele Baptist School and in 1930 was engag­
ed as an assessment elerk in the Sapele Township office, prom 
1931 to 1935 he taught, and then joined the British Bata Shoe 
company, in 1945 he took up employment with the Czechoslovak 
Bata Shoe Company. under whose sponsorship he visited Prague to 
undertake a diploma course in business organisation.
"He was there ... during the Communist seizure .' 
of power: and while he deplored the Communists1.re- . 
jecbion of democracy, he was, as a successful busi­
ness man, almost as upset by thsir ii.-^ ifference to •
•. efficiency in industry, shown fey the substitution of .
, political for technical tests jft choosing managers.
It was this experience-rather t!-vi theoretical de­
votion, to private enterprise v£ .made him ... im~ 
pervious to Soviet overtures." (2)
He returned to become extremely successful in commerce, his ma­
jor financial interests being m  rubber, timber and a ohain of 
schools. He was known to buy a big new c&'.r every year.
in 1951 Zik, a lifelong friend, persuaded him to stand 
in the West on an NCNC platform which he did successfully. In 
1955 he was appointed Minister of Labour and Welfare and in Sep­
tember, 1957 became Nigeria’s first Minister of Finance, a po­
sition he held until his assassination in January, 1966. - He . 
served as Leader of the Government in the House of Representa-. 
tives, and in the foreign policy division m  the NCNC the conser­
vative faction came under his leadership,. Of greater-importance 
was his guidance of the economic policies of Nigeria; he appre­
ciated the need for foreign investment and aid, and set about 
creating a conducive economic climate which guaranteed against 
state interference and nationalisation, and which necessitated 
maintaining good relations with the West. .
Jaia Anucha Wachuku, Minister of Foreign affairs, 1961 - 1964.
. . .He was bom in 1918 into a.family whose standing in. .. 
the aba district aided his political career. Having received 
his earlier education in Eastern Nigeria, he went to the Higher 
College, yaba-, the Gold Coast Peoples1 College and then to read 
law at Trinity College, Dublin, where he completed a Doctorate 
of Laws and won numerous prizes for oratory. -
He returned to practise in Aba, and joined the NCNC 
as legal adviser. In 1952 he became its Deputy Leader in the 
. Eastern House. In the party split '■ soke away from Zik but 
returned to the NCNC in-1957, and as House of Representa­
tives,-. and was appointed Minista . ■ Economic Development by 
sir Abubakar. Having performed well at the. united Nations, how­
ever, he took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in August,
1961. He impressed the Western countries with his restraint 
and the UN with his sound grasp of international problems, and 
these qualities, toge. h-'r with Nigeria's advent on the interna­
tional scene, led to election as the chairman of the UN Con­
ciliation Commission on the Congo.
Wachuku was soon bo run into trouble. Although at in­
dependence h© was classified as a radical, he was attacked 
strongly in Parliament by some members of th© NCNC and by the 
AG for the moderation of his foreign policy statements. He came 
under heavier fire, however,, from Cabinet JMnisters and Norther­
ners for failing to consult his colleagues at the UN and for ne­
glecting to seek authority from Lagos before making some of his ‘ 
statements, as also for personal bombast, The attacks grew so ' '
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strong ihnc m  late 1963 the Minister of state for Foreign' Af­
fairs, Senator Nuhu Bamali, on behalf of the Cabinet, was forced 
to repudiate one such statement and it was Bamali, not Wachuku, 
who led the Nigerian Delegation to a conference of Foreign Mi­
nisters in October, 1963. .
After the 1964 elections Wachuku was appointed to the 
position of Minister of Aviation, Sir Abubakar himself again 
taking control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a while, 
before appointing Bamali Foreign Minister.
nr Kincrslev Qzt’tomba Mbadi’wa, Adviser on African. Affairs to Sir 
Ahubakar, .and later Minister of Arade. .
He was born, in 1315, the son of a well-to-do Eastern 
Xbo businessman. He was educated in variout parts..of Nigeria, : . 
including the Hope Waddel Training College and the Baptist Aca­
demy, Lagos. In his early twenties he worked as .a reporter and
news agent for Zik's newly-formed West African.Pilot,.and .so... ;
was introduced to nationalist politics. .
Taking Sik as his model he set out for the United 
States in 1939 where he attended Lincoln, Columbia and New York . 
Universities, obtaining degrees in banking and finance and in 
government. While in the united States he became a popular lee- 
turer and published a books 'British and Axis Aims in Africa1.
{In 1956 he was awarded an honorary Doctorate of Laws at Lincoln.)
in 1948 ho returned to Nigeria and joined the NCNC. in 
1951 he was elected to the Eastern and Central Houses, becoming 
within a few years Minister of Lands and Natural Resources and . 
then of communications and Aviation. In 1957 he was appointed 
Leader of the NCNC in the Federal House and entered Sir Abuba- 
kar's cabinet as Minister of. Commerce and industry. . .
Mbadiwe was considered something of a firebrand, and 
in 1958 broke with Zik on the grounds that Zik1 s nationalism was 
too moderate, He was dismissad from party office and replied by 
. forming the Democratic party of Nigeria and the cameroons, which 
resulted in his losing his seat in. the 1959 elections. He re­
joined the party and regained his seat an<3 in May, 1951 the 
Prime Minister, in answer to calls for the establishment of a 
Ministry to handle relations with African countries, appointed 
hira his Personal Adviser on African Affairs. This was adjudged 
to be one of the Prime Minster’s shrewdest domestic moves for 
' he could 'now appear to be listening to the extreme nationalists
/
without needing to take their advice'. ^  xt also had the ef­
fect of bringing a strong cra.tic into line. One of Mbadiwe's 
first moves was to call the Ail-tfigana peoples• conference in 
August, 1961. ^  He accompanied the Prime Minister to Monrovia 
and on his visit to the United States * Ho became Minister of 
State in the Prime Minister's Office and took his place, after 
the 1964 elections, as Minister of Trade. .
nhiaf Anthony Bronaela Osecrhala Enal?oro, AG Shadow Minister of 
foreign Affairs. . • .
Born in 1923 in Urotrd in the Mid-West, he attended 
Government schools in Uromi and Owo wid King's College, Lagos.
Ha followed a career in journalism and served, as editor of a 
number of newspapers! Southern, Nigerian Defender, 1944; Daily . 
comment, 1945 and 1947 - 1949; West African Pilot (Associate 
Editor), 1946? and the Nigerian. Star, 1950 - 1953. He was elect­
ed General Secretary of the AG in 1953 and served in both the. 
Western and central Houses. . -
He became Awo's dnputy in the House of Representatives 
and acted as the opposition^ chief spokesman on foreign affairs. 
As such, he stuck very close to Awo. When A wo was pro-Western, 
so was he; when Awo became radical; so did he; when Awo was . 
jailed for ten years for treasonable felony, he received fifteen 
years? and when A w  -was released in August, 196S to. take.up a . 
position in Gowon’s Executive Council, so too was Enahoro.
Before independence Enahoro supported what he termed 
selective or independent alignment. He pointed out that, because 
of Nigeria's desire to remain in the sterling area, the. country 
was aconomieally aligned, and continued:
“We are aligned with the State in this particu­
lar regard Whicsh beliaves in the same things which 
we believe... Wo agpee with the western concepts 
of liberty and the dignity of the individual. And . 
so in this field we have our commitments. Even in ; 
the military question, the Prime Minister suggested. 
that ho hoped that we would continue to take advan- . 
tage of the training facilities offered by the 
United Kingdom." v3)
Ehis implied acceptance of Ul< military assistance- may be compared 
with his statements after independence in which he strongly at­
The Economist, 17.6.61, o. J.z4t 
See below.
HRDj March - May, 1950, 10. 4uj.
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tacked -the Government for duplicity in advocating a policy of 
non-aliTnment while at the same time maintaining a Defence -Pact . 
with the United Kingdom. . ..
aihaii. Muhammadu Ribadu, Minister of Defence,. 1560 - 1965, -
• Ha was born into a Fulann. family, living in Ribadu .
in the North, m  1910. He attended a Koranic School, taught : 
for a few years and worked as an accountant for the Adamawa Na­
tive Authority. . In 1936 he was elected to succeed his father- 
as village head, a.great honour, and in 1946 he received a Bri­
tish Council Bursary to stud/ local government in Britain.
In 1947 he became a member of the Northern House of . 
Assembly and in 1951 was elected-to that House and to . the House 
of Representatives, where he vas appointed Minister of lands and 
'Ijfo'tural Resources. In 1954 his portfolio was changed to that 
of Mines, Power and Lagos Affairs, in 19.60 to. Mines, and Power,.., 
and on independence he was appointed Nigeria’s first Minister . - 
of Defence. - -
It -was early in his term that the Defence Pact issue 
caitie to a. head, ■ oausingr the first -major foreign policy contro­
versy. . He proposed the motion authorising the Government to. 
conclude the agreement, pointing out that for some time-.after 
independence Nigeria would require military assistance. Al- . 
though the agreement was later .abrogated.Ribadu maintained close 
military ties with Britain. He did, however, succeed in de~ 
creasing' Nigeria‘s.dependence on aid from the mother, country by 
obtaining west German, Canadian, and to a lessee extent, Ethio­
pian assistance; while increasing Nigeria's prestige by the des­
patch of Nigerian troops to the Cotic?o and. Tanzania.. •
His political position, .stemming'from his-squire ori­
gins/ was considerably to the right of Sir Abubakar, and the . 
mutual respect which developed between him and the . Sardauna. . . 
added to his influence. He died in 1965. .
Zanna Bu'kar n.ipcharima, Minister of Comnvarae and industry, 19.58
- 1965. .
The son of the village head of Dipchari- in the North, 
he was born in 1917. He attended Primary School in Dikwa. where, 
as is the custom with sons of notable families, he w as brought, 
up in the Shehu's Palace; and then proceeded to Maiduguri and 
Katsina Higher College. .
He taught at Bornu until 1946 when he entered commerce 
as an agent for one of che large business concerns- John Holt •' 
and Company. In 1947 he was elected to the executive of the 
NCNC and attended some of the Constitutional conferences in Lon­
don. In 1954 he was asked by the ft PC to contest the seat for 
Bcrnu East and was elected to the House of Representatives. He 
served as President of the Bornu branch of the NPC and held . 
various native Authority posts. Sir Abubakar invited him to ■ 
serve as Minister without Portfolio and in July, 1958 "he replac­
ed Dr Mbadiwe as Minister of Commerce and Industry, in the last 
Cabinet be was appointed Minister of Transport, ■ . . .
. . . His views were similar to, and reinforced, those of .
Chief Okotia-Eboh since he was 'concerned with the practical 
rather than the doctrinaire approach to economic theory ' . exem­
plified by this statement: .
' "It follows that since we need capital and , . -
expert assistance to promote the development of - . ■•••■., 
our eaonomy, and since we cannot provide these . - . . -
■ factors from within the country, we must get them ..
• . from oveiseas-1 . - (1) • .-••••
MaXlam Amina Kano, Leader, of NEFP and government Whip.
- • He was b o m  into- the Fulani e-ian of jCano. Emirate 
known as the Genawa, having neither royal nor noble status, -but 
renowned as j-orists, prests and scholars, Aminu Kano sprang 
from just such a family, "his father having .been Acting Chief . 
Alkali (Moslem judge) of Kano and his grandfather a celebrated . 
Mallam (religious scholar)- . • .■• -•
. . After bis education at Kaciuna College h& travelled 
to England where' he came into contact with personalities-on the 
left wing of the £abott£ Party and read extensively Marx, Laski . 
and Gandhi. His background and education kindled a strong dis­
taste, for tho .Northern, hierarchical system in which he saw the . 
antithesis of democracy, S'hus, in 1950, he resigned his teach­
ing post because he believed that his country was 'a prisoner 
of . the Anglo-E\xlarii autocracy or the unpopular indirect rule 
system1; and because there was no freedom to criticise what he 
considered the 'most unjust and anachronistic and un-Islamic . 
form, of hollow institutions, promulgated by xugard’. . . .
1* HRD, 15-30 November, 1961, p. 357. . ..
2. Daily Comet, 11.11.50, pp. 1 and 4, xn Whittaker, C.S.Jr. 
op. cit., p. 8. . /; ■ •
Requiring the support of a mass political organisa­
tion, he joined.the ”'rthern Elements Progressive Union and 
soon assumed leads! Though generally regarded as more ra­
dical than the NCNC illied itself to that party in the
1959 elections and and itself in an extraordinary position 
when the NC:iO associated with the NPC, NEPU's main enemy. In 
this circuitous fashion Aminu Kano came to he appointed Deputy 
Chief Whip for the governing party, the majority of which he op­
posed. • . .
This did, not prevent him from voicing his opposition 
on many issues and joining forces with the radicals of the NCNC, 
notably Dr Kaltt Ezera, in attacking Government foreign policy.• 
Before independence,.for example, ha expressed his belief in a 
great African union; ha attacked the training of Nigerian dip­
lomats by foreign powers; and though a. Moslem, objected to the . 
idea of a foreign policy dominated by Moslem countries. . After 
independence he condemned the imbalance of Nigeria's friendship 
in-favour- of'the West, and pressed for a Parliamentary Committee 
on Foreign Affairs to aid the Government in pursuing a strict 
cu-arse of non-alignment. -
Joseph Sarvman Tarfca, Leader of the UMBC and Vice-President of . 
the AG. "
He was born, in 1932, the son of a farmer and clan 
head.. In 1947 he went to the Teachers1 Training College ar. .. . 
Bauchi, home town of Sir Abubakar, where Awinu Kano was his tu­
tor for a time. The influence of these two men stimulated Tar- 
ka to interest himself in public affairs. He returned to the 
Tiv country to teach for the Native Authority, in 1956, .how- ... 
ever, owing to his opposition to the Native Authority system, 
he resigned and entered the political arena on a full-time ba­
sis. He was elected President-Gener-al of the United Middle .
.•At Congress; whose dominating characteristics were hatred of 
flimsa-Fulani domination and the desire for a separate state.
The support o£ the AG for the UMBC resulted in an alliance of 
the two parties and Tarka was elected Vice-President of the AG.
During his; career numerous charges, inoluding that of 
treasonable felony (together with Awolowo) were brought against 
Tarka, but he was consistently acquitted. Finally/ in. 19s-' t ”he 
was imprisoned for insulting- the Premier of the North and for 
inciting disturbances. He was released by Gowon and appointed
to head the Ministry of Transport. .
. . in.the House of Representatives he had been the Opposi­
tion spokesman on commerce and industry, and on foreign policy 
he tended to fall, in line with Awolowo.. Before independence his- 
views on non-alignment approximated to those of Awo, and he call­
ed on Nigerians to be either Western or Eastern democrats and 
'since we are not disciples of the Marxist theory, we are West- 
{1) * ern Democrats 1,v Subsequent to independence he endorsed the
overall AG alterations in policy. ...
ni? Kalu Ezera, 'NCNC Member for Bende East. - .
When the uneasiness of radical members of the-NCNC con­
cerning Government foreign policy came into the open, their chief 
spokesman was a young intellectual, Dr Kalu Ezera, an ibo repre­
senting the constituency of Bende East. • . .
. 'Before entering Parliament: he had obtained a Bachelor 
of Arts degree from Lincoln University# a.Master of Arts from 
Harvard and a doctorate of Philosophy from Oxford. He was ap­
pointed a lecturer in Government, at the University College of . . 
Ibadan and when the university of Nigeria was established in . 
Nsukka he became Associate Professor- of Government and Dean of 
the Faculty of Social Studies. . ^
Though, a member of the governing coalition., -lie was one 
of its roast vocal critics -on foreign policy. As one of. its ori­
ginal detractors, he charged it with lack of dynamism, condemned 
the Defence Pact and challenged the Governmer - -attend, the. Bel­
grade Conference of neutral states, and. to ar ’..1 .spanish .is­
land of Fernando j?o. • • • • 
Conclusions and Comparisons. . - '
ijhe development of these sixteen personalities has been 
described in an attempt to understand the background to the fo- ■
.reign policies which each adopted and advocated; and the totali­
ty of Nigeria's international relations, largely a synthesis of 
the clash and blend of their views. The biographical factors 
selected are those bound to have influenced their political at- . 
titudes generally, and predisposed the approach of each, towards 
radicalism or conservatism.
I'hese terms must be perceived within their Nigerian . .
context/. which, compared with other African states, was itself 
a conservative context. To the most radical of this group, non­
alignment consisted in a balanced policy favouring neither East
nor West - in Mali, however, their terminology would have been 
deemed-mild and restrained. . ■
. Factors of origin judged likely, to create a predisposi­
tion towards conservatism are age, traditional status, family - 
wealth, Northern, Bausa-Fulani background, and Islam. On the 
other hand, youth/ humble origin, Southern, Christian or aniraist 
upbringing tend to produae a propensity for radicalism.
• School education also tended to consolidate these in­
trinsic factors- Northern education induced a respect for Islam • 
and a conformity with traditional systems and values, and looked 
to Mecca and Medina for inspiration. Christian-sectarian educa­
tion, while not necessarily progressive in itself, evoked in its 
teaching of the. English language and Western values, a receptivity 
to. new ideas and an .awareness of the-Wer t. . . . . . .
The- effects of higher education abroad., while general­
ly enlightening, were conditioned by background; so that where 
one student might absorb new concepts, another would reinforce . 
old ones.. - - ■ •
,■ : Occupational and professional categories evince the . 
individual J personal contacts, his social and financial attain­
ments,. and hint at the nature of his political leanings. .
Little new can bes deduced from formal party affilia- ■ 
tions since they were invariably consequent upon education and 
membership of tribe, region and religion,- except that views, had 
frequently to be adjusted to gain general support- m  the founding 
of new parties, or tempered and accommodated to accord with the - 
fluctuating policies of established parties- .-No background in­
formation could have anticipated some of the reversals in policy 
motivated by reasons either of expediency or of compromise. . .
Ahmadu Bello (born 1910}, Muhammadu Ribadu (1910), and 
Zanna Bukar Dipcharima (1917) were all of royal or noble birth, 
brought up as the sons of important men and in accordance with 
Islam. They all attended Teachers’ Training Colleges in the 
North, and taught and worked for the Native Authority. Both Bel­
lo and Ribadu studied in England while Dipcharima entered com­
merce. With such very similar backgrounds it was in the natural 
course of events that all three men should ^oin and beaome senior 
members of the NPC; and that of this group, they (in particular
Bello and Ribadu) ware considered the most 'conservative and 
their influence was towards the maintenance' of close relations 
with fellow Moslem states. • .
Sir Abubakar differed from these men in the signifi­
cant fact that he was of lowly birth and had worked his way to 
a position of eminence. He too was a product of a Northern Mos­
lem education ,• and of Katsina Teachers' Training college; after ■■ 
which he-taught in the Worth. He studied further in England 
where the British democratic processes, and the resultant oppor­
tunities for individual advancement, impressed him. His .attempt 
to adapt these principles to the North produced a rational and 
practical politician who appreciated the limitations of progress 
in the African context. Both his nature and his experience.led 
him to follow a restrained foreign policy based on a willingness 
to learn, a wish to please and a spirit of cpjiet compromise. ■ .
The two - Northern personalities who rej ected the tstpg . • 
and-the conservatism for which it stood, may be compared. Ami- 
nu Kano's family was one respected for its educational achieve­
ments rather than its traditional status. as a youth Kano saw 
his father, a respected judge, at variance with the Government . 
and the Native Authority, Though he was brought up.within Is­
lam, a spirit of independence was inculcated in him which sane- . 
tioned his absorption of leftist thought while a -student in . . 
Britain. He endeavoured to employ such ideals in domestic -po­
licy to revolutionise Islam‘and the North, and in foreign policy, 
to induce greater dynamism and radicalism. On the other hand, - 
Joseph Tarka, as a Tiv, had nothing in common with the Hausa- 
Pulani against whom his people had consistently ana sometimes -■ 
Violently fought. His essential aim, to improve the lot. of his 
people, he contrived to carry out by allying his party with 
the anti-Northem Action Group? and to obtain its support he 
was willing, though originally no radical, to endorse its.shift 
to the left in foreign policy.
' Azikiwa, Mbadiwe and Bzora were three Easterners, who
despite their differing ages, had virtually parallel histories. 
None was of noble birth (though Mbadiwe was of a wealthy family)' 
and all received Christian-sectarian educations. All attended 
both better and lesser known universities in the USA, which 
country generally produced a more revolutionary type of graduate
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impatient with'the old order. (1) On return all pursued the 
more liberal occupations of journalist and lecturer ~ rather 
than those of teacher, professional or businessman - so widen­
ing still further the gap between them and most of .the sixteen* 
They all became members Of the NCNC in which progressive climate 
they could exercise their talents for strong oratory and advance 
their views - outward-looking and in tune with, the rest of Afri­
ca, but discordant with the cautious, unexciting WPG line.
Zikls exit from active politics and. Mbadiwe's entry into Sir 
Abubakar's Cabinet served to mate though not to silence their 
criticism; Ezera, as a fat younger man holding ho position of . 
responsibility, remained one o£ the most vociferous critics of 
the Government's foreign policy.
One may also usefully compare and contrast the careers 
of the two Western politicians, Awolowo and Akintola. Bom 
within a year of each, other, their early education was Chris^ 
tian - Awo's at Wesleyan ana Akintola's at Baptist schools - fol­
lowed by law studies in England. At independence they were . 
fairly conservative, overtly pro-Western and wary of Pan-Africa­
nism. When &WG chose to redirect the course of AG policy to- . 
wards domestic socialism and foreign radicalism their underly-. 
ing differences became manifest. Being of. wealthy stock, and 
in accord with the capitalist interests in the party, Akintola 
rejected socialism,- having mastered the Hausa language while at 
school in the North and having established an affinity with Nor­
thern leaders, notably the Sardauna and Prime Minister Balewa, 
he refused to countenance a further widening of the breach be­
tween the North and the West. Thus he split with his leader and 
allied himsel£ with the NPC in Whose more sober .climate he felt 
at home and of whose measured foreign policy hs approved.
. The histories of Michael Okpara and Anthony Bnahoro . 
ran roughly parallel. Of similar age, they attended Government 
schools in the south* and received all their higher education in 
Nigeria, and neither entered comwoxce or teaching - Okpara was 
a medical doctor and Enahoro a journalist - as the majority of 
the group unrler discussion did. Okpara by joining the NCNC and 
Enahoro the AG exhibited regional loyalty, and both were to de-
!• Flint, John E., op. cit., pp. 159 - 16.0*
monstrate strong personal loyalty to their respective leaders,
Zik and. Awo. It was this adherence to the foreign policies of 
their leaders that was principally to account for their owh va­
riance in outlook. Before independence their differences were 
in degree; while Okpara was a practical promoter of pan-African­
ism, Enahoro was unenthusiastic; and while Okpara supported non­
alignment, though appreciating the importance of ties with the 
west, Enahoro advocated independent or selective alignment.
Their post-independence attitudes matched those of their leaders; 
so that Okpara retained M s  'beliefs but tried not to embarass 
the Coalition Government while it lasted, and Enahoro became a 
virulent neutralist and pan-Africanist, and an outspoken critic 
of what he termed th« Government's reactionary foreign policy.
Okotie-Eboh, Wachuku and Qsadebay, born within six 
years of sach other, attended Government ana Christian schools 
in the East and Mid-West and furthered their education an Cze­
choslovakia, Eire and Britain respectively; and all returned to 
Nigeria to join and attain eminence an the NCNC. Okotie-Eboh? 
of wealthy stock, was a successful businessman and capable ad- . 
ministrator, and strove to est;.^ lish a sound national economy 
which necessitated dependence upon the West. His age, financial 
and social status and his disillusionment with Communist business 
methods produced the most conservative senior member of the NCNC. 
Wactttiku, also of wealthy parents, tended towards radicalism,, 
possibly as a result of influences encountered during his so- 
jourrt in the Gold Coast, or his pfiffic-fj Sn Dublin. When* however, 
he was required to accommodate himself to coalition policies 
in Sir Abubakar's Cabinet, he demonstrated his willingness, for 
a time at least, to discipline himself and compromise. Osade- 
bay> while in the Senate, proved to be. a sober radiaal, but when 
the Kid-West State was created he devoted most of his attention 
to promoting its development..
-Reflecting and generalising on tlie group as a whole, . 
it can be deduced that a foreign policy which the majority of 
these men controlled would be Conservative, pro-Western and 
lacking in pan-African fervour. . -
At independence the majority of the group were over ^ 
the age of forty-five. Most were born into families of nobility, 
standing or wealth. Although only five were Moslem, four of 
them occupied very senior positions in the country prime Minis
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tar, Premier of the North, Minister of Defence and Minister of 
Commerce and Industry. (This would also bring substantial pres­
sure t° bear on the Government to establish closer relations 
with Moslem states.) Nine received education in Britain and on­
ly three in the United States resulting in a greater moderation 
than had these numbers been reversed. In all cases these were 
satisfactory period in their lives, areating an affinity and 
warmth towards those countries and a wish to maintain close bonds 
with them. On the other hand, none had been eduoated m  commun­
ist countries ^  and tr; ' could result only in coolness towards 
and wariness of Communism -uid the East. None except Wachuku had 
studied in another Africfi?i country, and none except Azikiwe had 
spent any time working in another African country, and there is 
little evidence of travel or personal contact within the conti­
nent. Tl;ls accounted for Nigeria's ignorance of Africa and the 
resultant lack of seal for the establishment of stronger links 
with its peoples. She majority had been teachers or professional 
and businessmen, occupations which usually imply conservatism. 
This was reinforced by the fact that none had backgrounds of la- 
(2)bour or trade union leadership. ' .
■ - Pressures for a more radical, neutralist and pan-Afri­
canist foreign policy can be expressed numerically: eleven of the 
sixteen were non-Moslem; ten had received Southern-Chrisfcian- 
sectarian educations; and twelve had undergone the broadening . 
experience of higher education abroad. In addition, Southerners 
were far more knowledgeably about and articulate on foreign af­
fairs;, and the appeal of radicalism was far more emotional, pas­
sionate and romantic than that of tame realism* she numbers, be­
lied the facts for moderate pressures outweighed progressive. 
Conservatism was further strengthened by the fact that outside 
of this group it had the backing of a parliamentary majority.
At independence nine of the sixteen oould be counted 
as conservatives - the four NPC leaders, the four opposition AG 
members and Okotie-Eboh - and seven as radicals - all the NCNC 
members except Okotie-Eboh. The radicalism of those seven was 
diluted somewhat: by the effects of coalition. The AG 3 attempt 
to step into the vaacuum on the left previously occupied by the
■ 1- Okotie-Eboh1s period in Prague was.under a non-communist
2- Thflaptist Workers' union in *icfc AKintola tea worted was 
more a religious than a labour associati n.
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NCNC resulted for a period of about two years in a radical ma­
jority within this group. With the split in the AG, however, 
the imprisonment of Awolowo and Enahoro and Akintola's unfetter­
ed freedomto declare his conservatism, conservatives once again 
outnumbered progressives in this select group and even in the 
relatively conservative Nigerian aoatext.
B. other Factors influencing International Relations.
I. Historical Factors. ■ . .
"As far as international politics is concern­
ed, perhaps Nigeria's lack of a national history 
is its greatest virtue. Like the. United States in. 
the nineteenth century, Nigeria in the twentieth 
century is free fco find its position in the world 
largely unrestrained by repressive traditions, it 
has no national past, real or fancied, to recover; 
it has no traditional enemies; it has no common my- . 
thology with holy scriptures to which, national po­
licy must be made to appear to conform?- it has no 
competition among religious leaders, each claiming . 
to know the true way as laid down in ancient reve­
lations; it does not have to appeal to j»st nation­
al principles fco compel present national acceptance 
of new o^osctivesj it has no common economic his- .
tory to which national policy must conform, or .
which must be repudiated in order to have a viable 
contemporary policy; St has no common traditional 
political structure to restrict the direction it 
. may take? it does not wen have a common religious . . 
hero to whose teachings policy must conform in or­
der to gat universal acceptance; in short, Nigeria 
as a nation is more Sully free than India, Burma or . 
even.China.11 ‘ (2-)
But, although Nigeria as a nation had no common trad] 
tion to limit its freedom of choice, its component regions had 
their own very long histories * thus evolved three different 
nations in three separate regions, each with its own culture 
and at its c'<m stage of development, each with its respective 
political party and political leaders. Such a background neces 
sitated a foreign policy developed on a basis of internal com­
promise. in order to satisfy three major parties, each answer­
able to a distinct following, Nigeria had to forge a foreign, pc 
licy in which the process of give and take was an essential elc 
mehfc.
.Nigeria1s own aaraful preparation for independence
1- Phillips, Clauae s. 3x., The ST J
reign policy, Northwestern University Pro , / P •
and 11. .
proved to most of the leaders the wisdom of slow but steady
progress. Further, the country's own, heterogeneity and the 
great difficulty experienced in bringing the peoples together 
gave Nigeria’s leaders some insight into the immense problems 
involved in uniting Africa, eo confirming the advantages of a 
measured -approach. Nevertheless, having been a colony and hav­
ing shared the pre-independence experiences of other African 
countries Nigerians had sentiments in common with Africa; and 
having argued the evils of colonialism to achieve sovereignty, 
it was natural to take a stand which, would accelerate decoloni­
sation in the .rest of the cor-' ‘ncnt.
Of Nigeria‘s historical relations with other countries 
the association with Britain was certainly ‘the most imposing 
heritage1; on the one hand there was the memory of suffering un­
der slavery and colonialism, and on the other there was ’ 'Bri­
tain's graceful withdrawal by negotiation which left a -certain 
reservoir of good will*. ('2'1 Nigerian culture had assimilated 
much, that was British and its leaders in particular were tied 
by bonds of friendship to the British people. In the pre-inde­
pendence period of negotiations all factions had been represent­
ed and none felt, excluded.- Ties with Britain were thus main­
tained, and would not easily be broken; yet the actions of the 
former mother country wore constantly under review for any hints 
of renewed colonialism,
®hese to a largo degree were determined by' historical 
factors. Owing to British imperialism and colonial fiat Nige­
ria's boundaries contained one of the largest land masses in 
Africa.. Sheer size was enhanced by the variety and quantity of 
agricultural production and the mineral resources embraced
"...A particularly relevant aspect of Nigeria s 
that may help to explain Nigeria's moderate position on 
the timing of African independence is that the senior par­
ty in her coalition government, the isn?G, had itself sough 
to delay Nigeria’s independence." Schwarz, nf
geria. The Tribes, the Nation or the Race. The politics or 
independence, Massachusetts, 1965, p. 21S'
Nunn, Grady H., Nigerian foreign Relations, irtThePolitics 
and Administration of Nigerian Government, ed. Blitz, 
Franklin, London and Lagos, 1965, Chapter 10. P- 251.
therein. The population, as declared after the 1963 census, ; 
stood at twice that of the next most populous country in Africa, 
Egypt. And the combination of huge manpower resources within a 
vast area and extensive natural resources made Nigeria potential­
ly the most powerful country on the. continent, which would be 
expected to play a dominant role in African affairs and become 
a leading, spokesman for Africa. _ .
The latent power of the country was, however, diminish­
ed by the lack of integration of its peoples? and Nigeria's lea­
ders had to. tread a wary path m  formulating foreign policy to 
accommodate diverse groups. This point has bsen brought home 
only too clearly by the dissipation of Nigeria's influence re- . 
suiting directly from the civil war,
Religious diversity also affected foreign policy. . 
About half the Nigerian population was Moslem and the presence of 
pilgrims travelling to Mecca through the Sudan and Saudi Arabia 
necessitated maintaining cordial ties with these countries. By . 
the same token it has created a dichotomy in gelations with the . 
Middle East, many Moslems wishing to express open Support for 
their co-religionists in their strug<„?.e with Israel. Further, 
the conservative-radical diversity on foreign polxcy frequently 
corresponded with religious differences, Islam in general having 
a restraining influence on policies which might otherwise have 
been more radical.
: Finally, population density, particularly in the south, 
resulted Iti fairly large migration of Nigerians to the nearby - 
island of fernrmdo ?o» to the western part of cameroun and to 
Ghana. Their treatment was from time to time a source of. offi­
cial concern*
III. The Pressures of Federalism.
The Exclusive Legislative List, Section 15 of the Con­
stitution, provided that the Federal Government had exclusive 
jurisdiction over external affairs. This was accepted as the 
firm! word on the subject, in theory at any rate, by writers, and 
politicians except for the present Commissioner for External Af­
fairs in Gowon's Government, Okoi Arikpo. His view was based on 
an examination of Section 69 of the constitution which reads: .
' > "Parliament may make laws for Nigeria or any .
part thereof with respect to matters not ^eluded . .
■ in the Legislative Lists for the purpose of imp!e-^ . 
menting any treaty, convention or agreement between
the Federation and any other country or any ar­
rangement with or decision of an international
- organization of which the Federation is a member-' 
provided that any provision of lav; enacted in " 
pursuance of this section shall not come into ‘ ‘ ' ' . 
operation in a Region unless the Governor of that ' '
Regio’i has consented to its having effect."
. &rikpo's interpretation of the effect of Section 69
was as follows: .
"... This simply meant that m  such matters 
. as education pother than, higher education), agri- 
.culture, heal-fh and other residual matters, the 
. Federal executive authority could not legislate : . 
to implement international agreements of the Re­
gional Governments.. In respect of any such mat- ' 
ter, notwithstanding the constitutional provision 
that external affairs were the exclusive respon­
sibility of the Federal authority, a Regional :
. : Government might refuse to give its consent or .
approval to legislation enacted by the federal . . .
legislature. If, therefore, the Federal Govern- . . 
ment entered into an agreement with the Government- • ~ 
of Israel to supply scientific apparatus to all . 
secondary .schools xn Nigeria, the Government- of .. . , 
Northern Nigeria could, exercising its aonstitu- • .
tional right, quite properly have refused to allow . .
. the ms& of such scientific apparatus.in any aecon-
- dary school in Northern Nigeria. No Nigerian need..
have been surprised that the Northern Regi on Pre- .
raier was pursuing a different foreign policy from.
. • that of the Federal Government.1' . (1)
. fcEikpo is discussing a statement made by. Sir Ahmadu .
, Bello late in 1965 to the effect that for him the. state of Is- . 
rael did ttofc exist. But surely there is a difference between 
a Region-having the right to prevent encroachment on its legis 
lative field by the federal Government circumventing the cons- , 
titution by making international agreements - which is certainly 
the object of the provisional clause in Section 69 -and, a Re- . 
gional Government making foreign policy statements and decisions., 
which the constitution expressly forbids. Thus while the North 
would be fully entitled to refuse the benefits .of a loan from 
Israel, its Premier had no constitutional right to make state- . 
merits on the recognition of Israel- Certainly Sir Abubakar had. 
clear views on the subject. For example, when , in August, 1964 
the Prime Minister and sir Rhraadu arrived.in l*agos together, a 
reporter asked Sir Ahmadu for his views-, on the Congo. The Prime
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M in is ter  intervened, saying 't h i s  is a matter for the Federal 
Government. I take objection to this question and will not like 
Regional Premiers -calking about it.' ^  .
This was bUt theoretical, and even prior to indepen- . 
dence was not borne out in practice. Before October, 1960 when 
the Regions were self-governing but foreign policy remained the 
domain of the British Government, regional overseas missions 
seeking economic and cultural ties became a common occurrence. 
After independence. Regional Governments, encouraged by their 
strong constitutional positions, continued these missions which 
often blurred the Nigerian image and embarassed. the Federal Go­
vernment, for inevitably they expressed views on world and. Af­
rican questions which did not always conform to those of .the 
Federal Government, or to each other. .
This problem was further complicated by the fact that 
Regional Bremiers were either leaders or deputy leaders of -poli-- . 
tical parties and had to promulgate the parties' views on foreign 
affairs. . HOW could their constitutional positions which prohi- : 
bited them from making statements be reconciled with the party., 
positions which required this of them? Further, the Regional . . 
Premiers did not accept that their positions were in. any .way in­
ferior to those of Federal Ministers? this was particularly so • 
in the case of the Premier of the North. . . .. .
The anomalous position of the North concerning rela­
tions with Israel has been referred to. While the Southern rer 
gions went out of their way to establish friendly relations with 
Israel - both Okpara and AHintola visited that country. - and 
practised a policy of strict neutrality towards the Middle East., 
in accordance with Federal policy/ the North, made its antagonism 
towards Israel and its support for the Arab countries clear. . .
A second controversy revolved around the Northern Pre­
mier's. 1961 visit to the Middle East and Pakistan during which 
he was reputed to have said he was exploring the possibilities 
of establishing a paA-2slamic commonwealth. There was an outcry 
in the southern press and an erribasassed Sir Abubakar denied that, 
the statement had l^ een made, but added that if it had, it would 
have been ultra vires the powers of a Regional premier. :
1. West African. Pilot, 28.8.64, in Mackintoah, John Ni^ " 2
• rian Government and politics, Allen and . » . '
75
. on other occasions Sir Ahmadu stated that he had lost 
confidence in the UN at a time when Sir Abubakar was expressing 
support £>r the Organisation, and he attacked the United States 
for resuming nualear tests while the Prime Minister declared 
his understanding of the American decision. ■
Before independence when the Federal Coalition was 
still formulating a foreign policy, Premier Okpara, on behalf * 
of the people of Eastern Nigeria, congratulated President 'Nkru- 
mah when Ghana attained republican status, praised its constitu­
tional provision for the surrender of its sovereignty to a 
United States of Africa, and expressed the hope that other Af­
rican countries would follow suit. In 1962 when the Federal 
Government congratulated Nkrumah on Ghana’s fifth anniversary., 
and commended his contribution towards the solving of world prob­
lems and the unification o£ Africa, Okpara, enraged by charges 
that Ghana was financing the Dynamic Party which opposed the • . 
NCNC in the East and by Nkrumah1 s criticism of Zik’s speech at. . 
the Lagcs Conference in January, 1962, publicly denounced Nkru- 
mah for subversion and for insults to Nigeria's leader.
She most serious alleged interference by the Western 
Region Government was reported in Nigerian newspapers as.the 
attempt to establish a western Nigeria information and Indust­
rial Development Office in New York. The Prime Minister imme­
diately wrote to Premier Akintola jointing out that this -was . 
constitutionally prohibited. Akintola. replied that the reports 
were false and reiterated his respect for the Constitution. The . 
West was further charged with seeking aid from France at the 
same time as Nigeria was in  the process of vigorous condemnation 
of French bomb tests in the Sahara. ^  . ..
’ Although these pressures on foreign, policy did not dif­
fer in kind from those exerted by political parties and their . 
leaders, they did give the impression that the Federal Govern- 
mentwas not the only spokesman on foreign affairs, that it was 
not always entirely in control and generally that Nigeria was 
speaking with too many voices. .........
1. Minister of Economic Development, HRD, ,3 0.March - 9.May, 
1960, p. 227. - .
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• iv. Economic Factors.^  .
. "The economic forces affecting politics and '
foreign policy stem from a) the structure ana na- :
• . ture of a country's domestic economy and its ex­
- ternal economic and financial relationships; b)
the objectives of the government and people as to •
the kind of economy and external relationships - 
they want; and c) the tension between a) and b)." (2)
put into Nigeria! terms: a) Nigeria was an underdeve- . 
loped country, with much potential, but lacking the capital and 
skilled labour to realise that potential; it was heavily depen­
dent on Britain and the West for aid, trade and investment; b) 
Nigeria wanted to be a developed, industrial nation, economically 
self-sufficient, free to trade with the world, and able to exert 
political sovereignty unhampered by economic dependence; and c) 
the tensions arose from the difference between what Nigeria wag 
and what it aimed to be, and from the frustration at not finding, 
a short path from a) to b). .
to advance from a) to b) Nigeria needed an enormous 
amount of foreign capital and know-how, and from th± time of in-, 
dependence it was clear that the only chance of obtaining thes? 
in substantial quantities was from the West., In 1962, for exam- . 
pie, the source of about 7034 of imports was the West, while 90% 
of exports went to the West. The comparable figures for the 
Soviet bloc wees \% and 1%. The rest of the world - Africa,
Asia and South America - accounted for- 259# of imports and less . 
than 10% of exports.
‘ virtually all the aid Nigeria received came directly 
from western sonrces, or indirectly through international bodies 
under Western control. About half the aid available to Nigeria 
in 1962 was American, in which year, apart from scholarships, 
the only Eastern European aid was a credit of an unspecified 
amount offered in March, 1962 and a possible S15 million Polish . 
loan which was under discussion. .
a full discussion of Nigeria's economic policies. in­
ternal ana external, ana of its external economic relation 
follows in the nact chapter. That discussion cannot Be 
divorces from the present one; rather, it w i l l - a 
detailed extension. Ihe aim of the present su“"f 
•however, is to analyse the influence of Higeria s eqrano. 
mic needs and objectives on the development of its loreign
Karaarclcf Andrew M. , Economic Determinants, in Mackay, Vernon 
op. cit., Chapter III, P- 55. . , . . . . . .
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; . 80% of t h e  £200 million, of overseas investment was 
B ritis h , and t h e  balance, apart from some Lebanese and Indian 
capital, was also Western. OTiere was no Soviet bloc investment.
■ If, after independence, any change were to have taken 
place in the pattern of Nigeria's economic alignment with the 
West, it would necessarily have been gradual, m  March, 1962, - 
the Nigerian Government promulgated the Six Year Development 
Plaii, involving.£676.5 million, of which one-half. {£338 million) 
would have to Gome from foreign loans and grants. Economic mis­
sions were sent to all parts of the world, paying special atten­
tion to the .communist countries, but despite trade agreements 
and offers of future aid from the latter, it remained clear that 
most aid would still come from the West. .
Does economic alignment lead automatically to politi­
cal alignment? . i .
•  "To accept outside economic aid, no matter ........
- /from-what source, or however minimal the. strings at- „. . 
tachad, represents psychologically a degree of in- -
■ - ’ fringement upon sovereignty.1’ (l) >
■ ; "{ehe problem is further complicated by the
fact that-the great powers are trying to establish 
zones of influence - they ... are anxious to. extend 
■ their contacts, widen the circle of their friends
■ . ana allies, and at times, to exercise a discreet. . .
but positive imperium over them." (2)
. External economic pressures m y  influence foreign po­
licy to a lesser or greater extent:.either conditions are im­
posed on the.receiving country, or implied; or the receiving 
country may strive, consciously or -unconsciously, to present an 
image agreeable to the donor country? and at the very least, . 
this, could mean not going out of one's way to. annoy donor states 
in matters vital to them but only marginal to one’s own inte- . - 
rests'.^
■ Did Nigeria, in developing its foreign policy, take
into account the necessity of retaining the goodwill of donor 
•or potential donor countries, and by its acts on the interna-, 
tional stage tryto satisfy them? The degree to which it did so 
was commensurate with the degree to which external economic fac
1. .cowan, L. Gray, p o l itical Determinants, in Mackay,
— op. cit., Chapter VI, p. I22- . . ' ■ .:
2»- Thiam, Doudou, op. cit., p. 99* , . a-Hamnent and. 
,,3‘ Anglin, Douglas S., Nigeria: Africa? Studies,
.Economic alignment, Journal of Moflarn Atric 
•• Vol. II, No. 2, p. 250. .. . .. .
tots influenced foreign policy, limited sovereignty and detract­
ed from the policy of non-alignment. .
.• in certain cases Nigeria's determination to express
its sovereignty and its policy of non-alignment prevailed over 
economic pressures- Nigeria's dependence on American goodwill 
has been made clear > Under the American Mutual Defence Assis­
tance control Act (Battle Act) of 1551 it vis stated:
“All military, economic or financial assis- : 
tance to any nation shall. .... be terminated forth­
with if such nation •.. knowingly permits the ship- ' . . 
ment to any nation or cortibinaiian o£.nations threa- . . 
tening the security of the United States, including 
the Union of Soviet ,Socialist Republics and all . ■ ■ 
countries under its domination, of any ... items of . ... . 
primary strategic significance used in the prouuc- , . .
' tion of arms, ammunition and implements of war. " ........
Nigeria did produce such a commodity - columbite, an. additive . 
for hardening steel used in nuelsar and space devices. <. During 
the Korean War Britain'introduced strict control of its export, 
hut in October, 1362 the Nigerian Government quietly lifted the 
restrictions, a ttove'inspired principally by a desire to deve­
lop new markets overseas S hut also having 'a political motive
- -to assert the principle of non-alignment1 ■ . The state De­
partment reminded the Nigerian Government of the terms of the . 
Battle Act but the Nigerians were undeterred. On 2nd July, 1963 
Nigeria; concluded a trade agreement with the soviet union under 
which the signatories undertook to encourage trade in. a -wide . 
range of products, specifically including- columbite. . However, 
no columbite -was - shipped to the Soviet union which appeared to 
have adequate reserves and the united States did not feel the 
mere readiness to sell to-bd of sufficient importance to pursue 
the matter. . ,
■ ' Aftes independence Britain offered to assume financial 
responsibility fior the inducements required by, and the travel 
and. educational allowances paid to British official invited to 
serve-in Nigeria,- ffihe offer was refused since Nigeriawishe o 
be free to recruit experts £rcm anywhere in the world, and an 
agreement of this nature might have given the impression tha ^ 
Nigeria was committed to accept only these whom Britain offeie 
' ' " ■ Nigeria also declined to conclude an arranged where­
by aid would be received from the EEC Overseas Develops . *
Anglin, Douglas G., op- cit., P- 252-
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since it required associate membership of the Community. Accord­
ing to Sir. Abubakar such participation in the Community would ' 
not have been compatible with the policy of non-alignment and 
would have hindered an unimpeded and enthusiastic promotion of 
African unity. For similar reasons Nigeria refused associate 
membership of the EEC/ in spite of the economic advantage of 
such membership. Later, however, Lagoa changed its position.
. • When France carried o'lfc, fcbv t.hird series of atomic 
homb tests in the Sahara, the iirsfc flinca independence, the Ni~ v 
gerian Government acted without* any consideration of the erotto- 
ritic consequences. Previously frustrated by the failure of its 
protests, it was now presented with the first opportunity to as­
sert its newly acquired independence. The French ambassador was 
ordered out of the country and French aircraft. and ships were . 
banned. As this seriously retarded the development plans of 
Dahomey, Niger and Chad, the ban was soon lifted, but diplomatic 
relations were not restored for several years. In the interim 
France delayed permission for the appointment of a Nigerian am- . 
bassador to the EEC, .-hampered necr tiations and held up the .sign­
ing of the EEC agreement with Hig.-wia. This impulsive act of- 
the Hrigerian Government was considered an error, even in Nigeria.
In April, 1S61 the Government similarly imposed a to­
tal embargo on trad© with South Africa, regardless of the loss 
of a potentially valuable market and source of aid, To liave con­
tinued trade relations would have been too much for Nigerian po­
liticians to swallow and would have resulted in Nigeria's exclu­
sion from a position of leadership in Africa. .
On other occasions, on the contrary, economic pres­
sures triumphed over political principles. For example, although 
the H&Ustein Doctrine did not refer to the suspension of eco­
nomic aid, this would have bean an inevitable result of a dip­
lomatic broach. 'Thus to retain West German aid Nigeria was re­
quired neither to recognise, nor to cultivate too close a.rela­
tionship with, East Germany, To Nigeria's lenders the question 
of German reunification was a cold war issue of little concern 
to them, which facilitated the Government pursuing a 'do-noth­
ing' policy. However, they did in fact go further than mere . 
non-recognition: no official Government representative visited 
that -country, although numerous missions travelled across Europe, 
both East and West? and no trade agreement was signed with.East
f-
/
Germany, although such agreements were concluded with almost all 
other' European Communist nations. This policy was a sensible • 
one, since the economic advantages of co-operation with West 
Germany were substantial and since Nigeria's interest in the 
political controversy was slight. •
- . Similar reasoning would explain why Nigeria could not 
.risk taking a stand against the United States over the invasion 
of Cuba, and why no official Nigerian delegation visited Cuba. - 
The decision to remain in the Commonwealth was one in which eco­
nomic self-interest was relevant. There was nothing unusual in 
this, but a repudiation of membership would have created an- un­
fortunate impression in government and business circles in Bri­
tain, and probably in the United States as well. The prime 
Minister, m  proposing the motion asking for independence, said;
"The reason why I personally want to see Ni­
geria taken into the Commonwealth is this.. . At 
. ‘ present we .are an under-developed country, in or­
. .der to expand our economy we must seek investments
from the richer and more developed countries ..." (1)
K& iso pointed out the advantage of other Commonwealth nations., 
deputising for Nigeria's interests in those countries in which. 
Nigeria could not afford to be represented. . .
. . Having rejected the idea of association with the EEC, 
the Nigerian Government soon realised that the country would 
suffer economically in competition with those African states 
which by the Yaounde Convention had become associate members. 
Thus negotiations began for some type of -agreement, which, while 
not involving Nigeria in tiny of the institutions of the Communi­
ty, would provide most of the economic benefits of .association. 
Although-economic pressures had rtot entirely prevailed, Nigeria 
had compromised in that its economic interests would be bound . 
up with BBC interests and in that small tax preferences had been 
granted to the Six. '
Economic interests had a cleat influence on the choice 
of countries in whiah embassies were established. Of the first 
five diplomatic missions established outside Africa^four were 
in the west - in London, Washington, Bonn and Rome. These
HRD, 11 - 22 January, 1960, p. 30. «erve
The other was in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, . ^sid-
the interests of the pilgrims, though fche Ainbassado^resid . 
ed in Khartoum. The sixth mission was established in Mos 
cow subsequently. .
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countries provided Sigeria with toe bulk oS aid received, too* 
two-thirds oE its exports and included four of its five best 
customers. .
Regional governments also faced similar dilemmas in­
volving questions of political principle and economic advantage 
The North chose to discount the economic advantages of an Is­
raeli loan and to stand by its pro-Moslem, pro-Arab sympathies 
The Western Government was alleged to have ignored the-principle 
involved in Federal Nigerian protests to France over the bomb 
tests and to "have requested French economic aid. The Eastern 
Nigerian Government refused to have its freedom hampered by 
Arab pressures and the Eastern Nigerian Development Corporation 
went into partnership with Israeli companies, resulting in Jor­
dan banning all trade with the ENDC.
Douglas G. Anglin concludes that although such ex- . 
ternal economic pressures had a clear influence on. Nigeria's, 
internal economic poliaies, their impact on foreign policy was 
not as great as might have been supposed. He points out that 
while there were but few examples of economic requirements having 
a significant effect on political decisions, there were a number 
where political principles prevailed over the possibilities of 
economic advantage:
. "... If the economic development of Nigeria . ...
: . is really as important as her leaders claim, it 
: would be reasonable to expect that economic argu- 
wonts would! be deaisive in all but the most vxtal 
issues affecting national security...
. • ... This is to advance the somewhat unfa- . ■ •
shionable view that/ in most cases, Nigerian lea- . 
ders pursue tho policies they do because, rightly 
or wrongly, they happen to believe in them... .
Personal and political conviction may be a 
better clus to an understanding. of Nigerian fo-j ,
reign policy than crude economic determinism." (1)
Anglin's conclusions appear to contain two weaknesses; firstly. . 
there have been no attempts to claim that economic pressures . 
direct Nigeria's foreign policy (so-called ’crude economic de­
terminism' ), and secondly, while personal conviction was impor­
tant, that conviction was based on what was beat for the count- - 
*Y. and this in turn was surely decided with economic advantage. 
as a principle criterion. This is not to go to the other ex-
Anglin, Douglas G., op. cit., pp. 262 - 263.
treme and state that Western economic pressure determined Nige­
ria's foreign relations, for there were many other factors in-' 
volved- Its influence, however, was substantial, and where the 
threat of non-continuance of aid wag imminent, as with the 
Hallstein Doctrine, Nigeria accepted the. condition. Had Ame­
rica exerted pressure on Nigeria in connection with the sale of 
columbite Nigeria would liavs yielded, quite probably, rather 
than lose American aid. ^  Sh.us while economic pressures might 
not have had the affect of raaMng Nigeria overtly pro-western, 
they Sid ‘have a large influence in keeping the Government wes­
tern-orientated and in preventing it from taking up strongly 
anti-Western positions.
V. The Major Political Parties- . .
a. T»he 1959 Election,
Britain having agreed to grant independence to Nigeria, 
the election of December, 195S thus became the first in which . 
political parties were required to formulate foreign policies 
for an independent Nigeria. Owing to the tough and complicated . 
internal issues which had absorbed the time of party leaders. 
in the decade before indapendonoa, little* thought had been given 
to international relations ana none of the parties had a defined 
foreign policy at the commencement of the campaign. .
Xt was Or AziKiwe who broke the ice with a statement 
' in the Daily tfimes o£ 22nd august, to the effect that foreign 
investment would ba cncouxagcd and no enterprise in existence 
hafora independence would Bo nationalised! the right to regulate 
eoimeiee. ana infiastiy voalS, -however-, be reserved: Nigeria 
would apply for membership of the United Nations and continue 
as a member of the commonwealth! a neutralist foreign t»l10Y 
would he followed with adherence to 'no axis of geopolitics^ a 
good-neighbour policy would he pursued in relations with 
countries, with whom an attempt would be mado to cstab ish c ‘ 
economic and cultural ties.
' • cMef Awolowo in Hi* ^  °n Uth and to
a later speech, stated that although the AG would promo a *
■ ship with African countries, for three reasons-it was un 
tic- to worn &>r a United States of Africa or an c
market: new states would be unwilling to relmquist i
Anglin submits the opposite. Ibid., P- 2j3*
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trenie and state that Western economic pressure determined Nige­
ria's foreign relations, for there were many other factors in-' 
voived. Its influence, however, was substantial, and where the 
threat of non-continuance of aid was imminent, a?? with the 
Hallstein Doctrine; Nigeria accepted the condition- Had Ame­
rica exerted pressure on Nigeria in connection with the sale of 
corumbi'te Nigeria would have yielded, quite probably, rather 
than lose American aid. ^  Thus while economic pressures might 
not have had the effect of making Nigeria overtly pro-western, 
they <3id have a large influence in keeping the Government Wes­
tern-orientated and in preventing it from taking up strongly 
anti-Western positions.
V. The Major 'Political Pasties. . ‘
a. The 1959 Election> . .
Britain having agreed to grant independence to Nigeria 
the election of December, 1959 thus became the first in which 
political pasties were required to formulate foreign policies 
for an independent Nigeria. Owing to the tough and complicated 
internal issues which had absorbed the time of party leaders 
in the decade before independence, little thought had been giver 
to international relations and none of the parties had a definec 
foreign policy at the commencement of the campaign- . .
it was Dr Azikiwe who broke the ice with a statement 
in the Daily Times o£ 22nd August, to the effect that foreign 
investment would be encouraged and no enterprise, in existence . 
before independence would be nationalised? the right to regulate 
commerce and industry would, however, be reserved; Nigeria 
would apply for member ship of the United Nations and continue 
as a member of the Commonwealth; a neutralist foreign policy 
would be followed with adherence to ’no axis of geopolitics'? a 
good-neighbour policy would be pursued in relations with Africar 
countries, with whom an attempt would be made to establish close 
economic and cultural ties. _
chief Awolowo in his reply on llth September, and in 
a later speech, stated that although the AG would promote fnenc 
ship with African countries, for three.reasons it was 'unrealis­
tic to work for a United States of Africa or an .African common 
market: new states would be unwilling to relinquish thei s
!• Anglin submits the opposite, ibid., p- 253.
ruignty to this end, :(d any such pressures would produce 'sus­
picion, distrust and disharmony1; Nasser's totalitarianism and ■ 
p;>n-Arato sentiments cou.ld only admit of a union in which Black 
Africa would become a satellite of Egypt and m  his view the 
wfe, which had 'one foot in Africa and another in Asia Minor, 
wiis the very antithesis of a workable African community’ ; 
and finally, there was no possibility of co-operation, with the 
whites of East and Southern Africa.
; . His opposition to a neutralist policy was expressed
fci'Ws: .
; . "cche question isc as between the Western
Bloc and Easton Bloc,, whore can a roan freely .
exercise his natural right to hold and express 
any opinion subject to such restrictions as may 
he laid, down by laws onaetod by the freely elect­
ed parliament of the land? The answer is ob~ 
vious: it is in the Western Bloc...
.• in. the present world contest, when atheistic
materialism is threatening to destroy or stifle 
all that is best and noblest in roan, neutrality .
- ' in international .affairs, whether passive, pasi- 
. tive or independent, is an unmitigated disservice 
• to humanity." 
lasting that some developing countries courted both Bast and 
West simultaneously, hoping to get 'the best of two worlds’, he . 
explored such 'double-dealing' tactics as both 'disreputable 
spd dangerous1. ^  Ewrtfher, he declared that closer economic 
and cultural relations* should bo fostered within West Afnaa, . 
that the cause of th© oppressed peoples of Africa should be 
championed; that the Urifeish Commonwealth should be supported, 
and that Nigeria's goodwill towards the Western democracies 
should be emphasised. ' • .
• zik, though approving closer bonds with the united . 
Kingdom and tho united States,. asserted that it would be^  'fool­
hardy1 to align Nigeria unconditionally with the West, which 
included the ‘worst oolonial powers', a policy which would only
West Africa, 19.9.53, p. 7S0. .
Phillips, Claude S. op. ait., PP- 16 and i/. &n
"Though Chief Awolowo novor in so many wo r d s o  a 1 ^  ■
alignment with the West, the inference to^e d^awn rrom^ 
his analysis and conclusions was °]?^ou?‘fo a 19s3f 
The Nigerian Federal Election of 1959, Qxfoid, xj 
p. 311. '
insult m  'antagonising certain powers' and in 'abdicating the 
sovereign right of Nigeria to exercise initiative in its foreign 
policy'- He strongly objected to Awo's contention that there 
was no ’community of interest' between the UAR and the rest of
Africa.^
Replying on behalf of the AG, Chief Akintola stated 
that Nigeria's alignment with tho Western democracies included 
not only the former colonial powers and the United states but 
•also Commonwealth countries; that within the Commonwealth and 
Western context Nigeria would maintain its diplomatic initiative; 
that a choice of a friend did not necessarily imply the creation 
of an enemy (for example, India had relations with both tha . 
Commonwealth nations and Russia); and finally, that no sincere 
Nigerian would exchange British rule for Egyptian control.
Encumbered by domestic problems, it was not until 16th 
September that the UPC entered the foreign policy arena with 
the. publication of a manifesto which opened with the words:
'Above all our Government will be based on the fear of God1, it 
denounced a policy of neutrality, declared that Nigeria should 
associate va.th countries whose, policies were 'animated by the 
same beliefs as hers', maintain 'the closest relationship' with 
the uk, expand 1 existing ties of friendship' with the USA, sup­
port the UN and the Commonwealth, and co-operate with other Af- 
naan countries, particularly those in West Africa. Regarding 
the last point, however, it was made quite clear that the ffl?C 
judged a West African federate or union to be 'premature1.
At this stage the AG and NPC corresponded closely in 
their views. It was the NCNC which offered alternatives in that 
it supported a policy of neutralism and advocated closer poli­
tical ties with Africa. These differences were shortly after­
wards blurred, first in an NCNC-iTEPO manifesto (9th October) and 
then m  an NCNC policy paper (V?.nd October}. The combined mani­
festo proclaimed that the alliance would not 'commit Nigeria to 
joining any military pacts' but would develop the armed foraes 
'on the basis of neutrality' like Switzerland; the question of 
'neutrality in military matters' would be considered after in­
dependence in terms of the 'national interest'; it would 'main-
West Africa, 19.9.59, p. 750. it
2- Daily Times, 18.9.59, in Phillips, Claude S. Jr., op. ./ 
p. 18.
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tain friendly relations with any sovereign state' which support­
ed or enforced > human rights and fundamental freedoms; and im­
plement a 'policy of non-alignment with any particular axis of 
geopoll tics' in order to preserve independence of 'approach to 
problems of international relations ' . .
. The NCNC paper which followed, apparently without 
NEPU's agreement, made its policy on neutralism still more con­
fusing. For it stressed the desire fox continued friendship 
with the West and, expressing 'deep admiration and affection 
for the United States', declared that Nigeria's relations with 
the US should he 1 very intimate and cordial'? and the following 
paragraph in 110 way enhanced the clarity of the party's inten- . 
tionsr- • : . •
"Although the NCNC prides itself as a Fabian 
Socialist party, Which is stoutly opposed to Com-. 
munism as a way of life, yet we do not believe .
that anti-cartsaunism in ana of itself, is a suffi- .
. eient basis for a foreign policy* Our relations 
. with the Eastern bloc should generally be based 
•. on a policy of peaceful co-existence while speci- ... - 
.. fieally it should be dictated only by Nigeria's . .
national interest." {1} .
The contents of this policy paper demonstrated that NCNC prin­
ciples on patt-ftfrieanism and West African.unity were closer to 
those of the other two parties than had previously been realised. . 
While favouring the concept of a West African federation, the.
NCNC appreciated that there were ’onerous difficulties involved’ 
(including the integraticnist policy of Prance), and recommended 
that 'the issue should remain a long term one'; and though it re­
ferred to pan-Africanism as a ’clarion call ... for.the liberation 
of all African peoples ... the most passionate and yet the most 
constitutional appeal made in the history of modern, nationalism',
(2)it was also termed a ‘long term objeotive'. .
. 'Thus as the election neared, it could be said that,
although principles had been stated in fairly vague generalisa­
tions, the three major parties conformed closely on foreign P°~ 
licy. This was fortunate for a country on fte brink of assuming 
sovereign status, since the multiplicity of its domestic prob- .
1-ems „as more than sufficient to handle. There was agreement on 
support for the UN, membership of the commonwealth, .close .
Phillips, Claude S. Jr., op. eit,, p> 20. 
Ibid. .
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identification with the UK, closer bonds with the USA, friend­
ship with the West and a wariness of Communist countries. There 
was general agreement that pan-Africanxsw was at best an ideal, 
yet there was clearlya difference of emphasis: while, on the 
one'hand, the North would strive to 'keep Nigeria from any but 
a token involvement with a pan-African or a Pan-West African 
•anion, or indeed with the revolutionary forces sweeping the 
continent'; ^  on the other hand, the NCNC stressed the import­
ance of ultimate unity, suggesting, as a first step, the estab­
lishment of a West African Consultative - Organisation to lay the 
foundations for a federation of West Africa, on the question of 
neutrality,, the parties differed again merely m  degree, for the 
effects of NCNC neutralist declarations were counteracted by 
subsequent pro-Western statements. . . . - .
The coalition Government joined an essentially conser­
vative party with an essentially liberal, but not radical, .par­
ty,- the former being the mo^e powerful, in addition the oppo­
sition was conservative and openly pro-Western; thus as the year
1960 commenced, foreign policy promised to be extremely moderate 
Western-orientated and micro-nationalist.
b. after the 1959 Election• . -
The period of -manifestos and  generalised policy pa­
pers ■was over, and the year I960 wan to witness the beginning 
of trends and pressures towards neutralism, pan~A£ncanism and 
radicalism, that had either been hidden or had not in fact 
existed before the election.
Within the NCNC a split developed between the more 
conservative members led by Chief Okotie-Eboh, and the iadical 
younger members, Whose spokesman was Dr Kalu E^era. Even wh*.-i 
supporting the Coalition in thair voting, the radicals, gene­
rally young, • educated men who had not attained, positions of res­
ponsibility, made their presence felt, articulately and effec­
tively; and the Government leadership found it necessary to pla 
cate them. These radicals pressed for a policy of non-alignment 
fearing that alignment with the west meant alignment with NATO; 
they were anxious that Moslem states should not have undue m- 
fluence on Nigerian policies and that diplomacy should not be
Diamond, Stanley, op. cit., p. 20.
J87
left in the hands of non-Nigerians? they believed that some 
sort! of pan-Africanism must be actively sought'? condemned the '
• Defence Pact? formed the Nigeria-Soviet Friendship Society under 
Dr o.E. Ememe? endeavoured to establish closer ties with Ghana 
and the Casablanca bloc? poured invective on apartheid; censured 
the Government for refusing to attend the Belgrade Conference 
of neutralist states and indicted the Government for lack of 
dynamism.
. . if the pressures within the NCNC had been hidden,
those within the AG had not even, existed and could not have been 
foreseen. Ik one of the strangest redirections of policy seen 
in Africa, Awolowo and the AG did a aomplete volte-face in fo­
reign policy, becoming vigorously neutralist and pan-Africanist. 
From mild approval of the Defence Pact in May, I960, the party . 
rabidly rejected it in November? and by the end of that year 
roost references to ties with the West load been dropped from- AG 
statements.. In June, 1961 Awo with some of his top leaders vi­
sited Ghana for five days, Nkrumah receiving them warmly. On 
their return., Awo advocated that Nigeria should ]om the Ghana- 
Guinea-Mali Union and denounced the Government's attendance at. 
the Monrovia conference which he alleged had been convened with 
Western financial backing. In July, 1961, Awo published ait ar- 
tide in the AG paper, The service, entitled My Plan for Africa1, 
in which, he charged that many of the 'ostensibly independent' 
African states ware not free (this included all the Monrovia 
countries), since they had had military and economic ties forced 
upon them by the European mother countries. He proposed the. 
formation.of an Organisation for African community, open to po­
litical parties and nationalistic movements, but not to govern­
ments. its purpose would toe to soak the fulfilment.of ten 'aims 
and objectives'; the first being;
"‘Complete freedom and sovereignty for all .
those African State* which are at present only . .
nominally independent'? {2} setting of target 
dates 'in the vary near future' for the indepen- 
dene a of all African colonies.? (3) 'immediate 
termination of the existence of any military base 
in any part of Africa1? (4) extermination of . ,
apartheid in South Africa? (5) outlawing o£ . .
discrimination against 'black people in 
lar and Africans in general1 in Africa and other . 
parts of the world? (6) defense of the dignity 
of the African'? (7) establishment of ,.
nity of interests among all the people -o ' » ,
(8) division of the continent 'into zones' as a ' 
first 'practical step towards the emergence of 
an All-African political union1? (9) introduc­
tion into each zone of a customs and monetary 
union and other forms of cooperation? and (1 0) 
non -involvement 'of all African countries in the 
present East-West power politics and struggles 
as well as non-partisanship in the Rrab-lsraeU 
dispute and conflict'." (1)
Xn September he continued his attacks in a speech to students 
in London in which ha charged that the British High Commission­
er was the real ruler of Nigeria, that NATO operated a secret 
wireless frequency in Nigeria, that Nigeria was a British satel­
lite, that Sir Abubakar never mads a decision without consulting 
Mr Macmillan, -and that tho Government had placed every obstacle 
in the way of a Russian Embassy being opened.
An authoritative explanation, for this dramatic shift 
has not been discovered, but a number of theories have been put 
forward. Some attributed it to Avo’s bitterness after losing 
the election and finding himself excluded from power and the lea­
der of a weak opposition. Thus ha switched to radicalism, an 
available attitude for an. opposition party and one which would 
enable him to fulfil his proper function as leader of the oppo­
sition. But this view fails to explain why he altered policy 
so essentially as to lay the party open to charges of hypocrisy, 
others attributed it to the influence of Nkrumah and in parfcacu- 
lar to the effects of hie five-day visit to Ghana in CGone, 1951. 
Since Awo had been moving in this direction for a year priot. to . 
this date., it would be an oversimplification to assign Nkrumah 
as the cause. It would be more accurate to say that his move 
to the left had led Awo to visit: Ghana. Whatever, the explana­
64.Phillips, Claude S, Jr., op. cit.
"This volte-face actually came after a fcive-aay visi-c/ 
in June 1961, by Chief Awolowo and his top party leaaers 
to Ghana ... On their return to Nigeria, chief Awolowo^ 
who is Known as a strong and determined character, 
prisingly showed signs of having been much anfluenc y
• Dr StaMh's views ...» Esora, Kata, 
velopraents in Nigeria^ Cambridge, Second Edition, -
"ChieC Awolowo seems clearly to have Iuonced||by
fMsidant Hkrumah1 s views in the coarse o*his _stay, 
cowan, x,. Gray, Nigerian Foreign *°licy, “
Politieal Scone, ed. Tilrem, 0., and cole, Taylor, i-o, 
bridge, 1962, Chapter VI, J>. 130.
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tion, his stay accelerated the -transformation.
It is necessary to recall that as a younger man Awo 
had been capable of radical thought as witnessed, by some of the 
views expressed in his book, 'Path to Nigerian Freedom^ for exam­
ple: 'We of today are critical; unappreoiative, and d-> not feel 
that we owe any debt of gratitude to the British1.(1) He may 
well have felt, that whereas it had been expedient to shelve his 
radicalism for a tirfte, it was now advantageous to bring it into 
the open. JPor the change of foreign policy must be seen as part 
of the overall change of policy, whereby Awo hoped that the peo­
ple of Nigeria,, disappointed with the siow rate of progress of 
the Coalition Government, would look to a party with more uto- • 
pian and socialist policies. Such internal policies are more 
compatible bedfellows with radical, neutralist, macro-nationalist 
ideals than with restrained and, pro-Western ones* On the per­
sonal level, awolowQ seeing that, in the absence .of zik, there . . 
was no fiery, charismatic leader.in Nigeria, may well have as­
pired to such a'position, in addition, noting the developing 
split in the NCNG, he may have hopad. to drive a wedge into that 
party by alienating still further the young progressives from 
the rest of the party and ultimately bringing them ever to hxs 
side. - .
It was ironically Awo’s AG which was riven by thebe 
policies; and Akintola's fears that AG opposition, to the Federal 
Government would only draw th^ fire of the latter onto the party 
were strengthened by Awo's immoderate attacks on the Government’s 
foreign policy, in 1963 Akintola and his newly organised united 
Peoples' party resumed power in coalition with the Western NCNC, 
ana the AS was weakened to the point of ineffectiveness.
ffha years after independence 1 saw the NPC literally 
lifted by the artioulato radicals of the NCNC, abetted by the 
Action Group and the prasss, and. re-directed toward goals which 
that party had not even dreamed of before’ * 2 Bufc whether the 
reshaping of policy was substantial or superficial is difficult 
to discern; for what frequently occurred, in James Burnham's 
terms, ^  was that while the thesis (the nation's objectives in
1- awolowo, Obafemi, Path to Nigerian Freedom, London, -347,
_ p. 18. , si
2- Phillips, Claude S. Jr., op. oa.t-.P- policy, South
3- Burnham, James, Dialectic of American i°r a
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